国有企业引入战略投资者的三方演化博弈及仿真分析

Three-party Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis on Introducing Strategic Investors to State-owned Enterprises

国有企业引入战略投资者是新一轮混合所有制改革的实施路径之一,涉及多方利益主体。文章基于有限理性假设,构建政府、国有企业、战略投资者三方演化博弈模型,对参与主体的行为逻辑与策略选择进行分析,并通过数值仿真考察不同初始条件下政府、国有企业和战略投资者的策略选择以及关键参数变化对演化结果的影响。结果表明:政府、国有企业和战略投资者对彼此参与意愿的影响程度不同,国有企业受政府参与意愿的影响较大,国有企业和战略投资者对彼此的影响呈非对称特征;政府激励力度加大能提升国有企业和战略投资者的参与意愿,而约束力度加大则表现为抑制,且国有企业更加敏感;战略投资者对新企业未来经营风险更敏感,更注重混改之后的经济利益。文章研究为完善混合所有制改革政策体系提供了参考依据。

The introduction of strategic investors to state-owned enterprises is an important implementation path of SOE mixed ownership reform,involving multiple stakeholders.Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality,this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model including government,state-owned enterprises and strategic investors,analyzes the behavior logic and strategy choice of the three parties in the process of introducing strategic investors to state-owned enterprises,and uses simulation analysis to investigate the strategic behaviors under different initial conditions,as well as the influence of the change of key parameters on the evolution results.The results show that:government,state-owned enterprises and strategic investors have different influence on each other's willingness of participation.The state-owned enterprises are more sensitive by the government's willingness of participation.Government institutional supply behavior will affect the strategic choice of state-owned enterprises and strategic investors.The increase of government incentives will enhance the willingness of participation for both of them,while the increase of government constraints will inhibit,and the state-owned enterprises are more sensitive.Strategic investors are more sensitive to the future business risks and pay more attention to the future economic benefits of participating in the reform of mixed ownership.This study provides a reference basis for further improving the policy system of mixed ownership reform.