摘要
文章基于由制造商通过入驻电商平台开通的平台直销渠道和传统线下零售渠道构成的、存在服务竞争的双渠道供应链系统,在考虑实体零售商不同类型的公平关切行为和消费者渠道偏好双因素的情况下,构建了电商平台和实体零售商关于服务竞争的博弈模型,通过对模型均衡结果的纵向分析和横向对比得到以下主要结论:(1)制造商能否从实体零售商公平关切行为中获利取决于平台佣金比例和零售商公平关切类型两个因素,且在二者合适的组合下,制造商可能“不劳而获”;(2)而平台能否从零售商公平关切行为中获利,除了因素佣金比例和零售商公平关切类型之外,还取决于消费者渠道偏好;(3)零售商并不一定始终能从自身的公平关切行为中获利:零售商最优利润随自身纵向公平关切程度的增强先减小后增大;当消费者更偏好于线下渠道时,零售商最优利润随横向公平关切程度的增强而提高,反之降低;(4)零售商不同类型的公平关切行为会对其他成员的利润产生相反的影响;(5)零售商横向公平关切行为提高了渠道均衡服务水平,而纵向公平关切行为降低了渠道均衡服务水平。最后文章还进行了数值算例分析以验证相关结论和得到更多启示。
With the rapid development of e-commerce and e-commerce platforms,more and more manufacturers choose to open online direct channels by setting up an official flagship store on e-commerce platform based on existing traditional offline retail channels.Such as Dell,Haier,Nike,Adidas,Estee Lauder,Paris L′Oreal,etc.In the meantime,with the expansion of the mobile Internet,there are more and more ways for consumers to obtain product prices of different channels.Now,in addition to the traditional communication methods,consumers can obtain accurate price information of online channel and offline channel through various price comparison APPs,such as“Miaomiaozhe”,“Wochacha”and“Huihui Gome”.Hence,product price of different channels has being more and more transparent.This phenomenon makes manufacturer have to implement the uniform pricing strategy between the online and offline channels,which leads to competition between channels from price competition to service competition.Furthermore,with the transformation and upgrading of China′s consumption structure,consumers pay more and more attention to service and shopping experiences nowadays.Consequently,consumers′channel preferences and channel service level have become the key factors affecting consumers′channel choices.Faced with this situation,it is crucial for the e-commerce platform and physical retailer to determine the optimal level of channel service level.What′s more,behavioral economics research has proved that fairness concerns do influence human decision behavior.And the direct online channel established by manufacturer relying on e-commerce platform will dramatically cannibalize the market share of physical retailer,as a result,physical retailer will feel unfair due to channel encroachment,which leads to physical retailer exerts fairness concerns.That will inevitably impact the decisions of the physical retailer and e-commerce platform.Taking together,this paper aims to analyze the equilibrium state of dual-channel e-commerce supply chain with service competition under the interaction of physical retailer′s fairness concerns and consumers′channel preferences.Based on the above discussion,we theoretically explore a two-tier dual-channel supply chain in which a single manufacturer sells its product to consumers both through its online direct channel relying on an e-commerce platform and traditional offline retail channel with a brick-and-mortar retailer.The previous studies where firms in a channel are involved in various types of competition as well as with various types of contract schemes.By contrast,this study addresses a typical model in which the channels compete in service with a linear demand affected by online and offline service level.In doing so,it could appropriately fill the gap in the existing literature as a first step towards analyzing a fair dual-channel supply chain in the presence of channels service competition.Specifically,we first analyze a Nash game as a benchmark where e-commerce platform and fairness-neutral retailer set service level simultaneously in the face of consumers′channel preferences.Next,we incorporate the retailer′s vertical fairness concerns(also known as distributional fairness concerns)and retailer′s horizontal fairness concerns(also known as peer-induced fairness concerns)into the benchmark model respectively.To capture the discussed issues,this study constructs a game model of an e-commerce platform and a fairness-concerned brickand-mortar retailer when they compete in service,the equilibrium results of models with consumers′channel preferences and retailer′s different types of fairness concerns are obtained.By analyzing the equilibria of the same model vertically and comparing the equilibria of different models horizontally,we find that:(1)The manufacturer may still obtain additional profits from the appropriate commission ratio and the type of retailer′s fairness concerns,without considering the decision-making power of the manufacturer in the supply chain system with channel service competition;(2)In such a dual-channel supply chain system,the e-commerce platform earns commissions from the manufacturer and provides service to consumers as an intermediary,but its profits are closely related to the manufacturer′s online channel′s sales,and thereby it has a competitive relationship with the bricks-and-mortar retailer.Consequently,apart from considering the consumers′channel preferences,an e-commerce platform should also incorporate the retailer′s fairness concerns into its decision-making system;(3)Physical retailer does not have to pursue fair profit distribution at the expense of their interests.Under the influence of consumers′channel preferences,when the retailer uses different reference points to judge whether the profit distribution is fair or not,the retailer may still obtain more material payoffs;(4)The retailer′s horizontal fairness concerns can improve service level under the dual-channel supply chain equilibrium,while the vertical fairness concerns reduce the service level of the system equilibrium;numerical examples show that under the influence of consumers′channel preferences,retailers′horizontal fairness concerns may improve system performance,while retailers′vertical fairness concerns reduce system performance.This paper mainly gets the following management enlightenment:(1)Under the free competition market environment,manufacturers may also gain more profits by appropriately transferring their decision-making power;(2)In the era of intensified service competition,e-commerce platforms will inevitably compete with physical retailers fiercely.And considering the behavioral factors of physical retailers will help correct the deviation in the decision-making process to obtain more profits;(3)For the physical retailers with fairness concerns behavior factors,incorporating consumers′channel preferences behavior factors into their decision-making system can help them obtain more profits while pursuing fairness;(4)Consumers can benefit from retailers′horizontal fairness concerns regardless of consumers′preferences for the traditional offline channel,however,vertical fairness concerns are harmful to consumers.Therefore,enterprises should pay more attention to the physical retailers′fairness concerns when making decisions.
作者
赵燕飞
王勇
ZHAO Yanfei;WANG Yong(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China;School of Business,Anhui University,Hefei 230601,China;Chongqing Key Laboratory of Logistics,Chongqing 400044,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第5期116-129,共14页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71672015)
重庆市研究生科研创新项目(CYB21052)。
关键词
公平关切
消费者渠道偏好
电商平台
双渠道供应链
服务竞争
Fairness concern
Consumers′channel preferences
E-commerce platform
Dual-channel supply chain
Service competition