考虑信息泄露的双渠道供应链零售商订单决策及其复杂性研究

Retailer′s order decision and its complexity in dual channel supply chain considering information leakage

非对称信息下考虑由一个供应商和两个市场地位不同的零售商组成的双渠道供应链,大型零售商拥有线下渠道和线上渠道,小型零售商只有线下渠道。本文基于完全理性假设,构建信号传递博弈模型,研究供应商总是将大型零售商线下渠道订单量泄露给小型零售商时零售商的最优订购量策略;基于有限理性假设,进一步构建动态博弈模型,分析零售商订购量动态演化特征。研究发现,信息泄露对双渠道供应链信息泄露策略的影响与单渠道供应链不同,线上渠道的存在避免了大型零售商在高需求与低需求市场相互模仿订购量的情形;有限理性假设下供应链系统的稳定性受订购量调整速度和线上渠道订购量对线下渠道价格敏感系数的影响,订购量调整速度较大时,供应链系统将通过倍周期分岔进入混沌状态。

Under the circumstance of asymmetric information,the information owned by each participant in the supply chain is different,which leads to frequent opportunistic behaviors.Among them,information leakage seriously damages the interests of the information dominant party and the whole supply chain.With the development of e-commerce,more and more enterprises invade the retail market through direct marketing channels,making the dual-channel supply chain become the mainstream direction of supply chain development.The existing research on single-channel information leakage cannot be adapted to the more complex supply chain structure.This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain composed of one supplier and two retailers with different market positions.The large retailer has the offline channel and online channel,while the small retailer only has the offline channel.It analyzes optimal signaling strategy of the large retailer under the assumption of perfect rationality and dynamic evolution of the large retailer′s order quantity under the assumption of bounded rationality,with information leakage existing in the supply chain.Futhermore,the balanced order volume under the dual-channel supply chain structure is obtained.Under certain assumptions,the paper considers the supplier will leak the order information of offline traditional channel of the large retailer to the small retailer.First of all,on the basis of the theory of signal transmission,based on the complete rationality hypothesis,it studies the separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium orders decision of the large retailer and the small retailer;Secondly,based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality,the evolution model of dynamic order quantity of the large retailer is further constructed,and the stability region and stability conditions of the evolution model are analyzed.Finally,the conclusion is drawn by comparing the single channel structure with the double channel structure and the equilibrium order quantity under the assumption of perfect rationality and bounded rationality.The first part is based on the complete rationality hypothesis,building a single channel and double channel respectively under the supply chain structure of signaling game model.It discusses the retailer′s separation equilibrium and pooling equilibrium order quantity when the supplier always leaks the order quantity of the offline channel of the large retailer to the small retailer under two cases the large retailer has only one offline channel or has both online and offline double channels.It also analyzes the mechanism of information leakage under different channel structures and the equilibrium strategy choice of each member of the supply chain.The second part,based on bounded rationality hypothesis,respectively constructs quantity dynamic game model under the separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium.The stable domain diagram of the large retailer′s order quantity,the bifurcation diagram of the large retailer′s order quantity changing with adjusting speed and the Lyapunov index diagram of the order quantity evolution system are drawn through Mathematic numerical simulation software.Through the above simulation diagrams,this paper analyzes the dynamic evolution characteristics of the large retailer′s order quantity,and then futher obtains the dynamic characteristics of the change of order volume of the small retailer.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows.1)It is found that the information disclosure strategy of dual-channel supply chain is different from that of single-channel supply chain.Dual-channel supply chain is easier to achieve separation and equilibrium.The existence of online channel will affect the information disclosure in offline channel,and avoid the situation of the large retailer imitating each other′s order quantity in high-demand and low-demand markets.2)Under the assumption of bounded rationality,the stability of the supply chain system is affected by the order volume adjustment speed and the online channel order volume to the offline channel price sensitivity coefficient.When the order volume adjustment speed is large,the supply chain system will enter into chaos through period-doubling bifurcation.3)Under the assumption of bounded rationality,the greater the influence of the order of offline channels on the price of online channels is,the larger the stable region of the order volume evolution system of the large retailer is under the separation equilibrium.The greater the influence of the order quantity of offline channels on the price of offline channels becomes under the pooling equilibrium,the greater the stability of the order quantity evolution system of large retailers in the horizontal direction and the smaller in the vertical direction becomes.