软件交付模式和定价策略研究:SWS或SaaS

Distribution and pricing policy for software:SWS vs.SaaS

传统套装软件(shrink-wrap software,SWS)和软件即服务(software as a service,SaaS)是两种常见的软件交付模式,SWS交付模式下软件可在通用基础上二次开发并部署安装在用户本地服务器上,SaaS交付模式下软件提供商通过互联网将软件应用程序交付给远程的企业用户。本文考虑一个由两家软件提供商和企业用户构成的市场,每个软件提供商都可以选择采用SWS或者SaaS模式向市场提供软件产品,分别研究不考虑软件质量提升(短期视角下)和考虑软件质量提升(长期视角下)时软件提供商的交付模式选择。研究发现,无论在短期视角下还是长期视角下,企业用户需求越统一、SWS模式二次开发成本越高时,提供商越倾向于选择SaaS模式。在长期视角下,当质量提升成本系数适中或较高时,可形成一家提供商独占市场类型均衡或两家提供商都获得正利润的均衡。最后,我们分析了质量提升对提供商、顾客和社会福利的影响。质量提升在大部分参数范围内损害提供商的利润,对顾客和社会福利有利。

With the development of computer and software technology,companies have begun to use software to improve the efficiency of operations and management.It has become a trend to purchase professional software to assist in management.SWS(Shrink-wrap Software)and SaaS(Software as a Service)are two common software distribution modes.In the SWS distribution mode,the software can be installed on enterprise users′firms locally and customized on a common basis,and software providers need to cover the customization cost.The software provider in the SaaS distribution mode delivers standardized software applications to remote enterprise users via the Internet,and users need to bear unfit costs.The two distribution modes have their advantages and disadvantages,thus software providers are faced with the problem of how to choose the distribution mode.In addition,providers are also facing the problem of making software quality decisions.The upgrade of software performance can enhance the competitiveness of the provider′s products.Therefore,software quality will have an impact on the competition between SaaS and SWS providers.In this paper,we mainly study the impact of the customization cost of the SWS mode and the unfit cost under the SaaS mode on how the software providers choose the distribution mode and make pricing decisions.We utilize theoretical tools such as optimization theory and game theory to solve and analyze this problem.This article considers a market composed of two software providers and enterprise users.Each software provider can choose to use the SWS or SaaS distribution mode to provide software to the enterprise users,and every enterprise user will buy the service of one provider.We utilize Hotelling model to analyze the market,assuming that the users′preferences for the brand are evenly distributed in the interval[0,1].Providers 1 and 2 are located at the left and right endpoints of the interval respectively.We assume the two providers first decide their distribution mode,and then determine the software price,conducting a two-stage non-cooperative game.Then we derive the customer′s utility function and the provider′s profit function.The software providers choose distribution mode and make pricing decisions to maximize profit and the enterprise users choose the provider that offers higher net utility.We both consider the short-term perspective,in which software quality is fixed,and the long-term perspective,in which software providers make decisions on the improvement of software quality.Software quality here mainly refers to software features and functions such as availability,reliability,maintainability,and portability,and does not include differences in service quality caused by customization.Using the KKT condition in optimization theory we find providers′optimal price and quality decisions under four possible competition situations.Then we compare the profits under different competition situations to get equilibria,and the equilibriums show which distribution mode software providers will choose when the customization cost of the SWS mode and the unfit cost under the SaaS mode varies.The result shows,in both short-term and long-term perspectives,if the enterprise users′demand is unified and the customization cost of SWS mode is low,the providers are likely to choose the SaaS mode.At this time,the standardized software provided by the SaaS provider is sufficient to meet the need of most enterprise users.However,the customization cost of the SWS mode is too high,which causes a loss to the providers′profit.From a long-term perspective,when the cost of quality improvement is low,equilibrium cannot be achieved due to fierce competition.When the cost of quality improvement is moderate,one provider dominates the market and occupies the whole market share under equilibrium.When the quality cost coefficient is high,symmetric or asymmetric equilibriums both can be achieved where both firms obtain positive profit most of the time.Finally,we analyze the impact of considering quality improvement on providers,customers,and social welfare.For providers,at least one provider′s profit declines,because two providers pay additional costs for quality improvement.If the cost of quality improvement is high,when the customization cost of SWS is moderate and the demand of enterprise users greatly differs,the quality improvement can be beneficial to one provider.Because that provider can use quality improvement to attract more customers and obtain higher profit.For customers,if the cost of quality improvement is moderate,considering quality improvement leads to an increase in the quality of software,which is beneficial to the customer,i.e.,the total net utility of the customer increases.If the cost of quality improvement is high,when the equilibrium changes from both providers choosing the SWS mode to the providers choosing different distribution modes,considering quality improvement reduces customers′total utility.Because the SWS provider is likely to monopolize the market and sets a relatively high price.Moreover,for social welfare,if the unfit cost decreases in this situation,the SaaS provider can also obtain a certain ratio of the market.But the loss due to the unfit of the SaaS mode leads to a decrease in social welfare.In other cases,social welfare increases.