政府会计监督与审计定价:“治理效应”还是“标签效应”

Government Accounting Oversight and Audit Pricing:"Governance Effect"or"Labelling Effect"

本文以1999-2019年我国财政部会计信息质量“双随机、一公开”随机检查制度为准自然实验,探究了政府会计监督是否以及如何影响审计定价。研究发现政府会计监督能够显著降低审计定价,表现为政府会计监督的“治理效应”。机制检验表明,政府会计监督对审计定价的影响是通过降低企业风险,进而降低审计师的审计风险和审计投入来降低审计定价。“治理效应”在检查公告披露具体违规数据、有纳税问题、已经整改、聘请有行业专长的审计师和“四大”会计师事务所的企业中更加显著,且政府会计监督的治理作用具有行业溢出效应和监管的替代效应。本文从审计视角丰富了政府会计监督经济后果的相关文献,为进一步完善政府会计监督制度提供了经验证据。

This paper explores whether and how government accounting oversight affects audit pricing in a quasinatural experiment based on the"double random,one open"random inspections of accounting information quality carried out by the Chinese Ministry of Finance from 1999 to 2021.The study finds that government accounting oversight can significantly reduce audit pricing,which is manifested as the"governance effect"of government accounting oversight.Mechanistic tests suggest that the effect of government accounting oversight on audit pricing is to reduce audit pricing by reducing firm risks,thereafter auditor risks and audit inputs.The"governance effect"is more pronounced in firms that disclose specific non-compliance data in inspection announcements,have tax problems,make rectifications after audits,and hire auditors with industry expertise and"Big Four"accounting firms.The governance effect of government accounting oversight has industry spillover and regulatory substitution effects.This paper enriches the literature on the economic consequences of governmental accounting oversight from an audit perspective and provides empirical evidence for further improvements in governmental accounting oversightsystems.