非创新专管部门监管对企业策略性专利行为的影响——以证券交易所问询为例

The Impact of Non-Innovation Specialized Authority Regulation on Firms'Strategic Patenting Behavior——An Example of Stock Exchange Inquiries

目前我国企业“重数量、轻质量”的策略性专利行为严重阻碍社会经济高质量发展,如何解决这一问题受到学术界的广泛关注。现有研究大多关注创新活动专管部门对专利行为的政策性监管,忽视了证券交易所作为非创新专管部门对企业策略性专利行为的影响。研究结果表明,证券交易所对企业研发活动的监管问询通过“治理效应”和“信息效应”抑制了企业的策略性专利行为。进一步研究发现,良好的治理环境和信息环境有助于“治理效应”和“信息效应”的发挥。本文拓展了企业策略性专利行为的研究视角,为非创新专管部门抑制策略性专利行为提供了经验证据与有效参考,有助于推动企业和社会经济高质量发展。

At present,the strategic patenting behavior of Chinese enterprises,which emphasizes quantity but not quality,seriously hinders the high-quality development of society and economy,and how to solve this problem has been widely concerned by academics.Most of the existing studies focus on the policy-based regulation of patenting behavior by authorities dedicated to innovation activities,ignoring the impact of stock exchanges as non-innovation dedicated authorities on firms'strategic patenting behavior.The results of this study show that regulatory inquiries on R&D activities by stock exchanges inhibit firms'strategic patenting behavior through the"governance effect"and the"information effect".Further research found that good governance and information environments contribute to the"governance effect"and the"information effect".This paper expands the research perspective of strategic patenting behavior of enterprises,provides empirical evidence and effective reference for non-innovation specialized departments to inhibit strategic patenting behavior,and helps to promote the high-quality development of enterprises and social economy.