会计信息不可比与交易所年报问询

Accounting Information Uncomparability and Stock Exchange Comment Letters

本文考察了上市公司会计信息可比性的缺乏是否会引起交易所的关注并发放年报问询函。研究发现,上市公司的会计信息可比性越差,收到交易所年报问询函的概率越高,并且对于收到问询函的公司而言,会计信息可比性越差则越难以在交易所规定的期限内回函。这意味着会计信息可比性是交易所在年报事后监管中所关注的因素,对会计信息不可比的年报进行问询往往能切中要害,直击问题所在。进一步研究发现,非国有企业、由非“四大”会计师事务所审计的企业、被较少分析师跟踪的企业因会计信息不可比而受到交易所年报问询的概率更高,这表明交易所在进行事后监管时对具有更高机会主义披露倾向且会计信息不可比的监管对象保持了应有的关注。研究结果体现了交易所一线监管职能的针对性和有效性。

this paper examines whether the lack of accounting information comparability draw the scrutiny from the stock exchanges and issue comment letters.The results show that firms with less comparable accounting information are more likely to receive annual report comment letters.Moreover,for firms receiving a comment letter,accounting information uncomparability increases the probability of failing to meet the replying deadline specified by the stock exchange.The interpretation is that accounting information comparability is the concern of stock exchanges in the ex-post scrutiny of annual reports,and that inquiring into uncomparable annual reports usually hits the mark.Further tests indicate that non-stateowned firms,firms audited by non-Big Four accounting firms,and firms followed by fewer analysts are more likely to receive comment letters if their accounting information are uncomparable.This implies that the stock exchange is paying due attention to firms that have stronger opportunistic disclosure incentives and in the meantime report uncomparable accounting information.The findings highlight the pertinence and effectiveness of the front-line.scrutiny of the stock exchanges.