债券市场参与者认可董事高管责任保险吗——基于公司债券发行定价的经验证据

Do Bond Market Participants Care about Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance?——Empirical Evidence Based on the Pricing of Corporate Bonds

中国债券市场俨然成为全球第二大债券市场,债券有效定价对于激发市场主体活力、促进企业高质量发展具有深远意义。本文基于风险对冲视角,考察董事高管责任保险(简称“董责险”)对公司债券发行定价的影响及其内在作用机理。研究发现,认购董责险能够有效降低债券发行定价,通过工具变量法等控制潜在内生性问题后,结论依然稳健。路径检验表明,认购董责险提高了公司内部控制质量是影响债券发行定价的重要渠道。进一步研究发现,当管理层权力较大、投资者保护较差或财务风险较高时,董责险对债券发行定价的影响更强;认购董责险后,债权人减少了公司治理类企业契约条款的使用,但会设置更多的投融资类和期权类契约条款限制企业风险战略行为,保护自身权益;此外,认购董责险的公司发行债券的信用评级更高、债券期限更长。本文的结论有助于全面了解董责险在公司治理中扮演的角色,对于全面推广董责险具有重要意义,同时为如何提高公司债券信用评级、降低债券发行定价提供了经验证据。

China's bond market has become the second largest bond market in the world.Effective pricing of bonds has far-reaching implications for stimulating the vitality of market participants and supporting high-quality corporate development.From the perspective of insurance risk hedging,this paper examines the impact of directors'and officers'liability insurance(hereafter referred to as D&O liability insurance)on the pricing of corporate bonds and their underlying mechanism.We find that the purchase of D&O liability insurance can effectively reduce the pricing of corporate bonds.After controlling the potential endogenous problems through the instrumental variable method,the conclusion is still stable.The path test shows that the purchase of D&O liability insurance improves the quality of the company's internal control and is an important channel affecting the pricing of corporate bond.The impact of the D&o liability insurance on the pricing of corporate bonds is stronger when management has more power,poorer investor protection or higher financial risk.After purchasing D&O liability insurance,creditors reduce the use of corporate governance contract terms,but will set more investment and financing as well as option contract terms to limit strategic behavior of corporate risk to protect their rights and interests;In addition,companies that purchase D&O liability insurance issue bonds with higher credit ratings and longer bond maturities.This paper contributes to a comprehensive understanding of the role played by D&O liability insurance in corporate governance.Our conclusion is important for the promotion of D&O liability insurance.We provide empirical evidence for how to improve the credit rating of corporate bonds and reduce the pricing of bond issuance.