不同生产策略下新进企业产品质量决策及政府激励方式选择

Product Quality Decisions and Government Incentive Approach for New Entrant Under Different Production Strategies

在竞争环境下基于新进企业的三种生产策略,考虑消费者的质量与价格两种偏好,分别在质量投入激励与高质量产品销售激励下构建新进企业与在位企业的质量和价格竞争模型,利用博弈论和数理经济学分析方法进行模型推导和数值模拟,分别从消费者质量偏好与技术难度两个角度出发,分析新进企业的产品质量转型过程中的相关决策与政府的最优激励方式.研究发现:新进企业与在位企业的质量投入水平受到消费者质量偏好的限制,不同的消费者质量偏好将改变政府的最优激励方式;当技术难度较低时,新进企业从仅提供低质量产品到同时提供低/高质量两种产品的转型意愿更强;当技术难度较高时,如果新进企业仅提供高质量产品,那么选择高质量产品销售激励可进一步缩小两家企业间的利润差距,进而为政府退出产品市场提供契机.

Considering both quality and price preferences of consumers,this paper respectively builds quality and price competition models for new entrant and incumbent under quality input incentives and high quality product sales incentive,based on three production strategies for new entrant in a competitive context.Through model derivation and numerical simulation using game theory and mathematical economics analysis methods,we analyze the relevant decisions and optimal government incentives in the product quality transformation process of new entrant from the perspectives of both consumer quality preferences and technical difficulty.The results are that:The level of quality inputs of new entrant and incumbent is constrained by consumer quality preferences,and different consumer quality preferences will change the optimal government incentives;stronger willingness of new entrant to transition from offering only low quality products to offering both low/high quality products when the technical difficulty is low;if the new entrant offers only high quality products when the technical difficulty is high,then choosing a high quality product sales incentive can further reduce the profit gap between the two firms,which in turn provides an opportunity for the government to exit the product market.