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法律实施激励机制的基本原理及立法构造 被引量:3

Basic Principle and Legislative Structure of Encouraging Mechanism of Law Implementation
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摘要 对于受制于集体行动悖论的共益权规则、维权效益低下的私益权规则、难以标准化的义务规则、实施成本高昂的法律监管规则,以及责任边界不清晰、威慑作用有限的法律责任规则的实施,相关法上的惩罚机制作用有限。为了弥补惩罚机制功能局限、强化法律实效,应当为法律实施构建完善的激励机制,改变法律私人实施效用函数,将法律公共实施转化为私人实施,促使法律实施行为外部性内部化,消除法律实施过程的道德风险和逆向选择,引导法律主体主动遵守和适用法律规则,使其行为符合立法目的。申言之,一是通过经济利益给付、荣誉褒奖、资质评定和信用公示等方法,使法律实施与立法目标激励相容,以此克服集体行动困境,减少委托代理关系下可能出现的道德风险和逆向选择;二是厘清产权关系,将法律实施的外部性内部化,使每项行动决策的权利、义务和责任相对应;三是通过优先权奖励、保障权利行使、降低适用成本及法律责任减免或替代承担,使法律实施的成本收益结构回归均衡。 In legal practice,no matter the rules of common interest right or private interest right,or the rules of obligation,supervision or responsibility,they can notbe enforced effectively alone by the punishment mechanism.Therefore,more attention should be paid to the construction of the incentive mechanism for law enforcement.Firstly,taking the measures of economic benefit payment,honor reward,qualification evaluation and credit publicity to promote the law enforcement compatible with the legislative objectives,so as to overcome the dilemma of collective action and reduce the possible moral hazard and adverse selection under the principal-agent relationship;Secondly,clarify the relationship of property rights,internalize the externalities that may arise from the law enforcement,and make each action decision correspond to its rights,obligations and responsibilities;Thirdly,return the cost-benefit structure of law enforcement to equilibrium by priority reward,ensuring the exercise of rights,reducing the cost of law enforcement and reducing or replacing legal liability.
作者 董淳锷 Dong Chun'e
机构地区 中山大学法学院
出处 《法学》 北大核心 2023年第9期156-176,共21页 Law Science
基金 国家社科基金青年项目《经济法实施的激励机制研究》(16CFX057)的成果。
关键词 法律实施 法律实效 激励 惩罚机制 enforcement of Law efficacy of Law motivation punishment mechanism
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