竞争环境下两个B2C服务共享平台的均衡决策

Equilibrium decisions of two B2C service sharing platforms in competitive environment

针对服务共享中某个时段内可能出现供小于需或供大于需的情形(即情形S或情形G),研究竞争环境下两个B2C服务共享平台的最优定价与服务水平决策.首先,构建每种情形下两个平台的Nash博弈模型,并通过求解模型得到均衡结果,包括服务价格、服务水平、实际需求和平台利润.进一步地,分析不同情形下共享产品投放量对均衡结果的影响.研究结果表明:若两个平台总的共享产品投放量小于一个阈值,则情形S下一个平台的最优服务价格与共享服务水平均大于情形G下该平台的最优服务价格与服务水平.若两个平台总的共享产品投放量满足一定条件,则情形S下一个平台的利润大于情形G下该平台的利润.当消费者针对共享产品的平均使用量较大时,情形S下的社会福利大于情形G下的社会福利.

For the case that supply is less than demand(Case S)or supply is more than demand(Case G)within a time period in service sharing,the optimal pricing and service level decisions of two B2C service sharing platforms in the competitive environment are studied.First,the Nash game models of two platforms in each case are constructed,and the equilibrium results are obtained by solving the models,including service prices,service levels,actual demands and platform profits.Further,the effect of the number of shared products on the equilibrium results under different cases is analyzed.The research results show that if the total number of shared products launched by the two platforms is less than a threshold,the optimal service price and service level of a platform under Case S are greater than those of the platform under Case G.If the total number of shared products launched by the two platforms meets certain conditions,the profit of a platform under Case S is greater than that of the platform under Case G.The social welfare under Case S is greater than that under Case G when the average usage of shared products used by consumers is large.