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核电厂保护系统ECP硬逻辑设计研究

Research on ECP Hardware Logic Design for Nuclear Power Plant
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摘要 为保证核电厂的可靠运行,有效克服单一故障和共因故障影响,核电厂保护系统设计过程中必须充分考虑系统多样性和纵深防御设计。结合相关标准的单一故障、纵深防御设计要求,对保护系统的多样性措施进行分析研究,以探索一种因对软件共因故障失效的多样性硬逻辑设计策略,搭建典型的停堆硬逻辑和专设驱动硬逻辑设计原理,为后续核电项目的硬逻辑设计提供指导。 In order to ensure the reliable operation of the nuclear power plant and effectively overcome the single and common cause faults,the diversity of the system and the defense-in-depth design must be fully considered in the design process of the protection system of the nuclear power plant.Combined with the single fault and defense-in-depth design requirements of relevant standards,the diversity measures of protection system are analyzed and studied in order to explore a diversity of hardware logic design strategy for software common fault failure,the design principles of typical reactor shutdown and special safety device hardware logic are built to provide guidance for the hardware logic design of subsequent nuclear power projects.
作者 胡清仁 HU Qingren(Science and Technology on Reactor System Design Technology Laboratory,Nuclear Power Institute of China,Chengdu 610213,China)
出处 《自动化与仪表》 2023年第9期11-15,共5页 Automation & Instrumentation
关键词 核电厂 共因故障 多样性 硬逻辑 nuclear power plant common cause fault diversity hardware logic
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