跨国企业竞争环境下绿色产品创新与政府关税设计

Green Product Innovation and Government Tariff Policy with Competition against Multinational Firms

绿色产品关税政策是影响跨国企业绿色产品创新决策的重要因素。政府通过降低绿色产品关税让国外绿色产品进入本土市场,以市场竞争促进本土企业加速绿色产品创新。本文利用三阶段博弈模型对竞争环境下跨国企业和本土企业的绿色产品创新以及政府关税设计问题进行研究。首先,研究关税对于企业绿色产品创新投入以及市场竞争的调节作用,发现市场敏感度较低时,关税越高。相比跨国企业,本国企业的产品绿色创新意愿更强,且随着市场敏感度的变化而变化;当市场敏感度过高时,高关税将同时抑制两类企业的绿色产品创新意愿。在政府关税设计方面,本文发现,政府在以市场绿色度最大为目标时,在高市场敏感度下实施零关税政策是最优决策;而政府以社会福利最大化为目标时,当市场敏感度较高时,政府反而会提高关税抑制企业间竞争,并且关税随着市场敏感度以及绿色可替代系数的升高而增大。

With the increasing severity of environmental problems,consumers will pay more attention to the greenness of products when purchasing products.Environmental protection and environmental sustainable development both put forward higher requirements for the green innovation of products.The green product tariff policy is an important factor influencing the green product innovation decision of multinational enterprises.The government allows foreign green products to enter the local market by reducing tariffs on green products,and promotes local enterprises to accelerate green product innovation through market competition.How the government can use tariff policy to regulate green innovation input and competition intensity in the local market to ensure both domestic environmental and economic benefits is an urgent issue to be studied.Specifically,the problem is divided into two levels.The first is the micro-decision-making behavior of enterprises under certain tariff policies,that is,how do multinational enterprises and local enterprises make green product innovation decisions and output decisions,and explore how market sensitivity and product substitution will affect corporate decision-making?On the basis of clarifying the decision-making behavior of enterprises and the role of tariff regulation,we will study how tariff policies differ when the government maximizes the overall greenness of the market and social welfare.This paper considers a quantity-based competition model between local firms and multinationals.First of all,enterprises carry out green product innovation and research and development,produce and manufacture green products with a certain degree of greenness,and the products produced by the enterprise have a certain green substitutionability.This paper uses a three-stage game model to study the green product innovation and government tariff design of multinational and local enterprises in a competitive environment.Firstly,the impact of government tariff control on enterprises’green product innovation and output decisions is analyzed,and then the government’s tariff decisions will be discussed.First,we study the role of tariffs on corporate green product innovation input and market competition,It is found that when the market’s green sensitivity is low,the higher the tariff.Compared with multinational companies,domestic companies have stronger willingness to innovate green products and change with the changes in market sensitivity;When the market sensitivity is too high,high tariffs will simultaneously restrain the willingness of both types of companies to innovate green products.In terms of government tariff design,this article finds that when the government aims to maximize market greenness,implementing zero-tariff policy under high market sensitivity is the optimal decision;While the government aims to maximize social welfare,when market sensitivity is higher,the government will increase the tariff to inhibit competition among enterprises,and the tariff will increase with the increase of market sensitivity and green substitutability coefficient.This paper focuses on the impact between government tariff controls and green innovation decisions by local and multinational enterprises.Future research directions can consider the impact of the government’s implementation of green subsidy policies on enterprises.The model in this paper does not consider market uncertainty,and an extended model with market uncertainty and information asymmetry can also be considered in the future.These need to be further studied and demonstrated.