理由事实主义与错误情形问题

Reasons Factualism and the Problem of Error Cases

针对“行动的理由属于哪类事物”这一问题,标准观主张行动者据以行动的理由(即驱动性理由)是心理状态(比如欲望和信念)。近来,理由事实主义异军突起,大有取代标准观之势。事实主义者认为标准观并不成立,主张驱动性理由是事实或事态。然而,这一立场面临一个严峻的挑战,即错误情形问题,有些时候行动者据以行动的东西乃不实之情。通过考察事实主义阵营提供的三种代表性解决方案表明,事实主义者未能令人满意地解决错误情形问题。就此而言,事实主义的一般性主张是否成立,依然是一个悬而未决的问题。

What kind of thing is a reason for action?The standard view holds that the reasons for which an agent acts are mental states,such as desires and beliefs.Recently,factualism is becoming increasingly popular and has a tendency to outweigh the standard view.Factualists argue that the standard view is untenable.Instead,they claim that motivating reasons are facts or states of affairs.However,the so-called error cases pose a considerable challenge for factualism.In error cases an agent acts on the basis of a falsehood that he believes,so the reasons for which he acts are not facts.In this paper I discuss three main approaches proposed by factualists to account for error cases,and conclude that all the three main approaches are unsatisfactory.In that case,at least we can say that whether factualism can withstand scrutiny is still an open question.