模块副现象论与自由意志的相容性

Compatibility Study of Modular Epiphenomenalism with Free Will

物理主义占据着当今心灵哲学的主导地位,但物理主义面对心身问题的两难困境———机械决定论与自由意志难以两全———始终难以给出令人满意的回答。近来随着意志科学研究的发展,美国学者魏格纳根据行为科学等实验证据提出了模块副现象论,认为“有意识的意志是一种幻觉”,然而模块副现象论常遭到还原式解读的误解而被视为对自由意志的威胁。通过对魏格纳理论进行重新审视,一方面强调魏格纳对意志问题的区分以表明模块副现象论可以与意志自由体验相容,另一方面澄清关于模块副现象论的种种误解并表明其理论与还原物理主义决定论的差异,有助于走出心身问题的两难困境并在物理主义框架下为自由意志提供一个更合理的解释。

Physicalism dominates the philosophy of mind today,but there is still no satisfactory answer to the dilemma of the mind-body problem,that is,the difficulty of reconciling mechanical determinism with free will.With the development of the scientific study of the will,the American scholar Daniel Wegner proposed the theory of“the illusion of conscious will”based on experimental evidence from behavioral science.However,his theory is often misunderstood and regarded as a threat to free will by reductive interpretations.Based on the examination of Wegner's theory,this paper,on the one hand,tries to show that modular epiphenomenalism can be compatible with the experience of free will by emphasizing Wegner's distinction between the problem of will and,on the other hand,tries to clarify various misunderstandings about modular epiphenomenalism and show the difference between his theory and reductive physicalist determinism.A re-examination of Wegner's theory from these two aspects will help to overcome the dilemma of the mind-body problem and provide a more reasonable explanation for free will within the framework of physicalism.