基于演化博弈的政府监管视角下招投标合谋研究

Bidding Collusion from the Perspective of Government Supervision Based on Evolutionary Game

建筑工程是实体经济的重要组成部分,在建筑工程领域的快速发展中也存在着不少工程争议、工程事故以及工程项目腐败等案例,这些案例的背后往往存在着行为主体的合谋问题。基于博弈论中的演化博弈思想,与招标企业联合招标代理机构内定投标人的合谋行为相结合,在政府监管视角下建立诚信招标演化博弈模型。模型将不同行为主体的决策收益和成本按照博弈模型的构建规则和实际依据进行量化构成博弈参数,运用matlab进行仿真试验,对不同的博弈参数赋予不同的数值,分析行为主体的不同策略所产生的结果曲线,探索工程项目招投标中的合谋问题。研究结果表明,招标企业的合谋收益对招标企业的策略选择有直接影响,政府监管部门需要通过设立合理的激励惩戒制度,加大监管力度,提高对市场的监管能力,以促使招投标企业选择诚信招标策略,实现招投标市场的干净透明及公平公正。研究成果对预防工程项目事故腐败等问题起到警示作用,也为政府规范制度设计提供理论支持。

Construction engineering is an important part of the real economy.In the rapid development of construction engineering,there are also many cases of engineering disputes,engineering accidents and project corruption.Behind these cases,there are often collusion problems of actors.Based on the evolutionary game theory in game theory,combined with the collusion behavior of bidders in the joint bidding agency of bidding enterprises,an evolutionary game model of honest bidding is established from the perspective of government supervision.The model quantifies the decision-making benefits and costs of different actors according to the construction rules and actual basis of the game model to form game parameters,and uses matlab to carry out simulation experiments.Different values are given to different game parameters,and the results of different strategies of actors are analyzed.The curve explores the collusion problem in project bidding.The research results show that the collusion income of the bidding enterprises has a direct impact on the strategic choice of the bidding enterprises.The government regulatory authorities need to establish a reasonable incentive and disciplinary system,strengthen supervision,and improve the supervision ability of the market,which can promote the bidding enterprises to choose the good faith bidding strategy and realize the clean,transparent and fair bidding market.The research results play a warning role in preventing engineering project accident corruption and other issues,and also provide theoretical support for the design of government normative system.