水利EPC项目伙伴关系激励的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Partnership Incentive for Water Conservancy EPC Projects

为有效解决水利EPC项目参与主体合作关系不稳定的问题,基于有限理性和利益最大化原则,运用三方演化博弈理论,分析业主、总承包商和分包商在水利EPC项目伙伴关系激励过程中的策略选择,得出不同参数限制条件下的演化均衡策略,并对伙伴关系激励的动态合作过程进行演化稳定性分析。研究表明,博弈开始时,初始数据较小,构建伙伴关系获得的收益较小,三方意愿都较低;随着构建伙伴关系获得的额外收益提高和成本降低,共同收益和信息不对称收益之间的差值提高,奖罚力度和构建伙伴关系的比例合理化,三方都会选择积极构建伙伴关系,最终达到平衡状态。根据上述结论,提出激励策略,为构建水利EPC项目伙伴关系提供理论支撑。

In order to effectively solve the problem of unstable cooperative relationships between participants in water conservancy EPC projects,based on the principle of bounded rationality and benefit maximization,the three-party evolutionary game theory is applied to analyze the strategy selection of owners,general contractors and subcontractors in the process of partnership incentive in water conservancy EPC projects,and the evolutionary equilibrium strategy under different parameter constraints is obtained.The evolutionary stability of the dynamic cooperation process of partnership incentive is analyzed.The research shows that the initial data is small,the benefits of partnership construction are small,and the willingness of the three parties is low at the beginning of the game.With the increase of additional benefits and the decrease of costs,the rise in the difference between common benefits and information asymmetry benefits,and the rationalization of rewards and penalties and the proportion of partnership building,all three parties will choose to actively build partnership and finally reach a balanced state.According to the above conclusions,incentive strategies are proposed to provide theoretical support for the construction of water conservancy EPC project partnership.