董事高管责任保险与独立董事辞职——基于康美药业集体诉讼案冲击的视角

Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance and Resignation of Independent Directors:Based on the Shock of Class Action Case of KANGMEI Co.,Ltd.

董事高管责任保险(简称“董责险”)是公司的“治理利器”还是管理者的“自利工具”,是学术界长期争议的问题。随着特别代表人诉讼制度常态化开展,保险市场中董责险的需求将迎来爆发式增长,董责险的治理效应亟需更为细致和丰富的经验证据。本文基于中国版集体诉讼第一案——康美药业集体诉讼案冲击的视角,从独立董事对履职风险感知后的主动辞职行为出发,考察了董责险的治理效应。研究发现:(1)在康美药业集体诉讼案引起的独立董事辞职潮中,董责险显著提高了独立董事的辞职概率。该结论在经过配对样本回归、工具变量法、Heckman两阶段回归以及Placebo安慰剂检验等方法对内生性问题进行测试后仍然成立;(2)当公司外部审计质量较低、所处地区金融发展水平较低时,独立董事更可能从投保董责险的公司中主动提出辞职;(3)董责险对信息劣势更大、监督能力更弱的独董辞职的正向影响关系更强,支持了本文关于独立董事辞职行为是对董责险负面治理效应的风险感知逻辑;(4)董责险对独立董事辞职的正向影响主要存在于康美药业集体诉讼案之后,凸显了中国版集体诉讼第一案的示范效应;(5)本文最后利用事件研究法发现,投保董责险的公司在康美药业集体诉讼案事件窗口内得到了显著为负的超额收益。这些结果表明,现阶段我国的董责险主要是管理者的“自利工具”而非公司的“治理利器”。本文不仅丰富和拓展了董责险治理效应和独立董事辞职等领域的研究文献,而且对于完善新发展阶段特别代表人诉讼制度和董责险制度具有重要的政策启示。

The question of whether directors' and officers' liability insurance(referred to “DO insurance” hereinafter) functions as a corporate governance tool or a management self-interest tool has been a subject of ongoing debate and controversy among scholars.With the normalization of the special representative litigation system,the demand for DO insurance in the insurance market will see explosive growth.The governance effect of DO insurance needs to be fully tested by empirical evidence.This study examines the governance effect of DO insurance on the proactive resignation behavior of independent directors in light of the impactful class action case involving KANGMEI Co.,Ltd,which marks the first instance of a class action lawsuit in China.This study finds that DO insurance significantly increases the probability of independent directors resigning in the wave of independent directors' resignations triggered by the class action lawsuit against KANGMEI Co.,Ltd.The conclusion is still valid after alleviating endogeneity issues by paired-sample tests,instrumental variable method,Heckman two-stage selection model,or placebo tests.The positive effect of DO insurance on the resignation of independent directors is more pronounced for firms with higher external audit quality and those located in regions with higher financial development levels.These findings indicate that when firms have poor information environments and insurance firms have limited information acquisition capabilities,DO insurance is more likely to serve as a shield for managerial opportunistic behavior.The influence of DO insurance on the resignation behavior of independent directors varies based on their geographical location and ability levels.Specifically,the impact is more pronounced for cross-location independent directors and independent directors with lower abilities compared to their counterparts,namely local independent directors and independent directors with higher abilities.This finding provides support for the notion that risk perception plays a crucial role in the negative governance effect of DO insurance on independent directors' resignation behavior.The positive effect of DO insurance on the resignation of independent directors mainly exists after the class action lawsuit of KANGMEI Co.,Ltd,highlighting the deterrent effect of this class action lawsuit.Finally,this study employs the event study method and finds that firms that purchased DO insurance obtain significant and negative abnormal returns.The findings suggest that DO insurance in China is mainly a management self-interest tool rather than a corporate governance tool at present.Our study could make some contributions.First,we expand the existing literature on the governance effects of DO insurance.Our results provide more direct and reliable empirical evidence for the governance effects of DO insurance based on the perspective of independent director resignations.Second,this study enriches the literature on the determinants of independent director resignations,thereby deepening the research chain of factors affecting independent director resignations.Finally,this study provides valuable implications for enhancing the institutional frameworks of the special representative litigation system and the DO insurance system.