“突击花钱”如何影响政府绩效评价?——基于微观和省际面板数据的实证研究

The Impact of“Crash Expenditure”on Government Performance Evaluation:An Empirical Research Based on Micro and Provincial Panel Data

政府在预算执行后期“突击花钱”是各国普遍存在的财政支出绩效管理难题,严重的“突击花钱”意味着政府财政管理能力的不足。现有文献对“突击花钱”的实证研究主要旨在论述这一现象的成因,目前尚未系统分析“突击花钱”所带来的社会成本。本文基于“中国家庭追踪调查”微观数据和省际加总面板数据,分析“突击花钱”对地方政府政绩评价的影响,并探讨腐败感知的中介效应和财政支出结构的调节效应。结果发现,“突击花钱”会显著降低居民对地方政府政绩的评价,“突击花钱”会通过增加民众腐败感知程度的中介效应进而降低政绩评价。与基础建设支出相比,更高的政府民生支出比重会加剧“突击花钱”对地方政府政绩评价的负面影响。

The government’s“crash expenditure”in the late stage of budget implementation is a common problem of the fiscal performance management in various countries.Serious“crash expenditure”means that the government’s fiscal management capacity is insufficient.The existing empirical research mainly aims to discuss the causes of this phenomenon,and has not yet systematically analyzed the social cost brought by“crash expenditure”.Based on the micro data of the China Household Panel Studies(CFPS)and the aggregated panel data of each province,this paper analyzes the impact of“crash expenditure”on the performance evaluation of local governments,and discusses the mediating effect of corruption perception and the moderating effect of fiscal expenditure structure.The results show that“crash expenditure”will significantly reduce residents’evaluation of local government performance,and will reduce the performance evaluation by increasing the mediating effect of citizens’corruption perception.Compared with infrastructure spending,a higher proportion of government spending on public service will exacerbate the negative impact of“crash expenditure”on the performance evaluation of local governments.