银企共同持股与中国的企业创新

Common Ownership between Firms and Banks and Corporate Innovation in China

在“银行主导型”金融体系下,银行贷款是中国企业创新融资的主要渠道。如何引导银行资金更多地流向科技创新领域是高质量发展阶段有待研究的重要问题。银企因股东重合而形成的共同持股为企业融资和创新提供可能便利。本文使用2007—2019年中国A股上市公司与银行借贷关系微观数据,实证研究上市公司与其贷款银行间因股东重合而形成的银企共同持股如何影响企业创新行为。结果发现,银企共同持股显著提升了企业研发创新水平,在使用2015年“股灾”引发的政府救市这一外生冲击作为工具变量识别因果关系后,这一结果保持稳健。进一步地,影响机制检验表明,银企共同持股通过提升企业贷款规模而促进创新;同时,在非国有企业、外部融资依赖度更高、信息不对称程度更高的企业中,银企共同持股对创新的促进作用更显著,验证了银企共同持股通过缓解融资约束与降低信息不对称程度两种渠道促进创新。本文的研究为理解银行在高质量发展中的作用提供了新的视角。

As China has entered a stage of high⁃quality development,it is imperative to study the optimal financial structure for the stage.China's financial system is bank⁃centric where bank loans are the major source of financing for corporate innovation in China.In the stage of high⁃quality development,this bank⁃centric financial system seems inefficient in promoting innovation through risk⁃sharing.Therefore,how to adapt the bank⁃centric system to corporate innovation underlying the high⁃quality development is an important question to answer.Actually,China's financial system has changed profoundly.In particular,with the institutionalization of the financial system,the relationship between banks and firms has become increasingly close,in the form of increasingly popular common ownership between banks and non⁃financial firms.This relationship may facilitate innovation of the associated firms.Using the data of the lender⁃borrower relationship between Chinese A⁃share listed companies and their lending banks from 2007 to 2019,the paper empirically investigates whether and how the common ownership between listed firms and their lending banks due to the overlapping shareholders affects corporate innovation.It finds that this kind of bank⁃firm common ownership significantly enhances corporate R&D activities and innovation.After we used the exogenous shock of the government bailout in the stock market crash in 2015 as an instrumental variable for common ownership,this conclusion remains robust.Further,the common ownership promotes innovation by increasing the loans from the bank.For non⁃SOE firms,those with higher external finance dependence or more private information,the effects are stronger.This further corroborates that the common ownership between banks and their borrowers promotes innovation through two channels:relaxing financing constraints and reducing information asymmetry.The paper has the following contributions.First,it is the first to systematically study the effects of common ownership between firms and there lending banks on corporate innovation in China using the data of Chinese listed firms and provides evidence from China.It also provides a new perspective of common ownership between banks and firms for revisiting the role of banks in promoting innovation.Second,using the exogenous shock of the government bailout in the stock market crash in 2015,this paper creatively identifies the causal effects of the common ownership on corporate innovation.In terms of policy implications,the paper provides a new perspective for rethinking the role of banks in high⁃quality development.It presents new insights for alleviating the financing constraints facing Chinese firms,by uncovering the microeconomic mechanisms of common ownership affecting corporate innovation in China.In light of the findings,the government can better exploit the common ownership between banks and their borrowers to enhance innovation.It can also regulate the common ownership,for instance,by improving the disclosure system,to take full advantages of China's bank⁃centric financial system.Regarding the government imperative of“making the financial sector better serve the real economy”,the role of common ownership between banks and their borrowers,identified in the paper,sheds light on how to combine bank loans with equity to galvanize the traditional bank⁃centric system to enhance innovation.Future avenues can draw on the current research and study the roles of the common ownership in corporate governance,cash holdings,and corporate performance,to deepen our understanding of common ownership between firms and their lending banks.