向央行借款对银行声誉的影响——理论与实证分析

The Impact of Borrowing-from-the-Central-Bank on Bank’s Reputation:Theoretical and Empirical Analysis

已有研究表明,商业银行向央行借款会被认为是其遭遇财务问题的征兆,即所谓的污名效应,而在中国向央行借款往往是银行实力的体现,似乎存在美名效应。本文在统一框架内研究了商业银行向央行借款对其声誉影响的理论机制,并通过中国银行业的微观数据进行检验。研究表明,向央行借款的抵押品条件具有甄别功能,可以向市场发出有关银行资产质量的信号,促使银行做出逆向选择,从而形成污名或美名效应;减少银行间市场摩擦、放松向央行借款的抵押品要求可以降低银行间贷款利率;对于中国商业银行,向央行借款既具有美名效应,又存在污名效应,此两者存在一个介于1.37%至2.54%之间的阈值,当银行向央行借款占比小于阈值时,可以降低其在银行间市场贷款利率,具有美名效应;而一旦超过这一阈值,则会增加其贷款利率,具有污名效应。揭示向央行借款信号的机制有利于协调金融稳定政策与结构性货币政策的发展,为央行创新贷款工具提供镜鉴。

Some studies have shown that Borrowing-from-the-Central-Bank(BFCB)is seen as a signal of financial problems for banks,the so-called stigma effect,while BFCB in China is often a signal of bank strength,which seems to have a reputation effect.Within a unified framework,this paper studies the theoretical mechanism of the impact of commercial banks'BFCB on their reputation,and tests it through the micro data of China's banking industry.The research shows that the collateral condition of BFCB has a screening function,which can send a signal to the market about the asset quality of banks,thus promoting the adverse selection of banks to form a stigma or reputation effect;and reducing the friction in the interbank market and relaxing the collateral requires for BFCB that the interbank lending rate be reduced by reducing the total net surplus of both sides of the interbank transaction.BFCB has both reputation effect and stigma effect for commercial banks in China,and there is a threshold between 1.37%and 2.54%.When the proportion of BFCB is less than the threshold,the lending rate in the interbank market can be reduced,which has a reputation effect;once it exceeds this threshold,it will increase the loan interest rate and have a stigma effect.The disclosure of the signal mechanism of BFCB is conducive to coordinating the development of financial stability policy and structural monetary policy,and provides suggestions for the innovation of central bank lending instruments.