地方政府债务、企业融资约束与企业创新

Local Government Debt,Enterprise Financing Constraints With Enterprise Innovation

在经济高质量发展阶段,地方政府债务对企业创新的影响需要充分考虑企业融资约束的制约。本文基于2009—2019年沪深两市A股上市公司数据,采用固定效应模型和门槛模型检验地方政府债务对企业创新的影响,以及企业融资约束对二者关系的作用机制。基准回归结果表明,地方政府债务对企业创新有显著的负向影响,地方政府债务规模越大,越可能抑制企业创新。门槛回归结果表明,地方政府债务对企业创新具有显著且单一的门槛效应。在门槛值以内时,地方政府债务能够促进企业创新;一旦跨过门槛值,地方政府债务会抑制企业创新。机制分析结果表明,地方政府债务显著提升了企业融资成本,其通过企业融资约束抑制企业创新。异质性分析结果表明,地方政府债务对非国有企业、小企业和东部企业创新的负向影响更明显。以上结论既可以为理解地方政府债务在企业创新中的作用提供新的视角,也可以为防范地方政府债务风险和促进企业创新等提供参考。

The expansion of local government debt has promoted regional infrastructure construction and domestic investment growth,which is conducive to improving people's livelihoods and promoting employment.However,it may also squeeze out financial resources,increase enterprise financing costs,and hinder enterprise innovation.At the stage of high-quality economic development,the impact of local government debt on enterprise innovation needs to fully consider enterprise financing constraints.Existing research fails to explain the impact of local government debt on enterprise innovation at the micro level.This paper discusses the relations among local government debt,enterprise financing constraints with enterprise innovation.Based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2009 to 2019,we explore the impact of local government debt on enterprise innovation and the mechanism of enterprise financing constraints through fixed effects and threshold models.Benchmark regression results indicate that local government debt has a significantly negative impact on enterprise innovation.The larger the scale of local government debt,the more easily enterprise innovation is constrained.Regression results based on endogeneity and robustness tests support the significant negative impact of local government debt,indicating that the benchmark regression results are robust.Threshold regression results indicate that local government debt has a significant and single threshold effect on enterprise innovation.Within the threshold,local government debt promotes enterprise innovation;once the threshold is exceeded,it will inhibit enterprise innovation.Mechanism analysis shows that local government debt significantly increases financing costs of enterprises,and thus suppresses enterprise innovation.Heterogeneity analysis shows that local government debt has a more significantly inhibitory effect on innovation in non-state-owned enterprises,small enterprises,and enterprises in the eastern region.This paper contributes to existing literature in the following two aspects.Firstly,at the enterprise level,this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the relations among local government debt,financing constraints and enterprise innovation,which is conducive to revealing the mechanism of the impact of local government debt on economy.Secondly,we test the impact of local government debt on enterprise innovation,confirming its significant and single threshold effect.In addition,the paper expands the research scope of local government debt and enriches research results in this field.Studying the relations among local government debt,enterprise financing constraints,and enterprise innovation can not only provide reference for policy formulation,but also provide guidance for economic growth and technological progress.The paper provides a new perspective for understanding the role of local government debt in enterprise innovation,and provides reference for preventing local government debt risks and promoting enterprise innovation.