剩余索取权激励机理、模型拓展与效率改进

Intrinsic Mechanism, Model Expansion and Efficiency Improvement of Residual Claim Incentive

企业剩余索取权是委托代理激励理论与现代企业经营者激励契约的核心要件,但对剩余索取权定价及其激励契约存在收益与风险不匹配、努力与业绩不对等两个方面的讨论仍未定型,激励契约效率损失问题仍未解决。针对现实中剩余索取权激励制度创新形式由纯粹的人力资本为依托转向以人力资本与物质资本双重投入为前提的激励契约发展趋势,研究基于经典委托代理模型引入经营者“出资购买”部分剩余索取权以及进一步引入相对业绩评价的改进思路重构了经营者激励契约模型,证明经营者出资及相对业绩评价均能改进激励契约效率。结论的制度含义在于:经营者剩余索取权配置在“免费赠予”的基础上追加经营者“出资购买”并采用相对业绩评价的契约安排是现代企业核心人力资本产权激励机制创新的重要进路。

Enterprise residual claim is the core element of the principal-agent incentive theory and the incentive contract of modern enterprise managers.However,the discussion on the pricing of residual claim and its incentive contract has not been finalized,and the problem of efficiency loss of incentive contract has not been solved.In view of the development trend of the innovation form of the incentive system of residual claim in reality from relying on pure human capital to the incentive contract based on the dual investment of human capital and material capital,based on the classical principal-agent model,we reconstruct a manager incentive contract model by introducing the improved idea of residual claim being partially bought by managers themselves and relative performance evaluation.The research shows that the managers'private investment in their company and relative performance evaluation with the benchmark of industry average performance can improve the efficiency of the incentive contract.The institutional implication of the conclusion is that the contractual arrangement that includes free provision of and managers'payment for residual claim,plus relative performance evaluation,is an important way to innovate the property right incentive mechanism of core human capital in modern enterprises.