“耳听不为真”——控股股东股权质押与分析师实地调研

Hearing Is Not Believing-Controlling Shareholders'Share Pledge and Analyst Site Visits

本文研究了控股股东股权质押对分析师通过实地调研获取信息行为的影响。研究发现,分析师会减少对控股股东存在股权质押公司的实地调研,因为这类公司的管理层会采用更积极的语言语调与分析师交流,向其传递乐观情绪,阻碍分析师获取真实信息。对股权质押公司的实地调研越多,反而导致分析师的预测误差更大,降低了分析师进行实地调研的信息收益。当控股股东面临的内外部监督更少、控制权转移风险更大时,上述现象更加明显。进一步分析表明,对股权质押的公司进行实地调研不能起到改善公司治理的作用。本文的研究表明,在股权质押的情境下,实地调研不能帮助分析师获取私有信息应对质押风险,反而成为控股股东操控信息披露,向市场传递乐观情绪的工具。

this paper investigates the impact of controlling shareholder's share pledge on analysts acquiring information through site visit.This paper finds that analysts will reduce site visits for firms with controlling shareholders'share being pledged.This is because share pledge reduces analysts'information gaining through site visit.Managers of firms with controlling shareholders'share being pledged are more likely to use more positive tone to communicate with analysts.Thus the more site visits analysts conduct to pledging firms,the less accurate forecast they will make.Besides,the negative relationship between controlling shareholders'share pledge and analyst site visits is more pronounced in firms whose controlling shareholders face less internal,external supervision and higher risk of losing control rights.Furthermore,this paper also finds site visits for share pledge firms cannot improve corporate governance.Overall,this paper reveals that during the controlling shareholders share pledge period,site visits cannot help analysts obtain private information to cope with the pledge risk.Instead,site visits will be taken advantage by controlling shareholders as a powerful tool to conduct disclosure management and convey optimism to the market.