中小股东治理与企业内部薪酬差距——来自非国有企业的经验证据

The Minority Shareholders Governance and Pay Gap Within Companies—Evidence from Non-SOEs

以2007-2019年沪深两市A股非国有上市公司为样本,在实证检验了中小股东参与治理对非国有企业内部薪酬差距的治理作用的基础上,本研究发现:中小股东参与治理显著抑制了非国有企业内部薪酬差距,且这种抑制效应具体表现为高管平均薪酬的降低和员工平均薪酬的增加。进一步研究发现,中小股东的薪酬治理作用在法律环境较好、业绩压力较大、第一类代理问题严重和第二类代理问题较轻的情景下更显著。此外,中小股东参与治理还可以提高企业短期绩效、长期绩效以及劳动收入份额。本文的研究丰富了企业薪酬契约的治理因素,为我国收入分配制度的完善及共同富裕的实现提供了非国有企业的经验证据。

Using a sample of non-state-owned A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2019,this paper empirically examines the role of small and medium-sized shareholder participation in the governance of the pay gap within non-SOEs.It is found that the participation of small and medium shareholders in governance significantly suppresses the internal pay gap,and this suppression effect is specifically manifested in the reduction of executive remuneration and the increase of employee remuneration.Further research found that the governance effect of minority shareholder participation on the intra-firm pay gap was more significant in scenarios with a higher proportion of network shareholder meetings,a better legal environment,higher performance pressure,severe Type I agency problems,and less severe Type II agency problems.In addition,the participation of minority shareholders in governance can be used to improve the short-term performance,long-term performance,and labor income share of the firm.This research enriches the governance factors of corporate pay contracts.It provides empirical evidence of non-state enterprises for the improvement of our income distribution system and common prosperity.