基于消费者购买历史的平台企业价格决策

Price Decision of Platform Enterprises Based on Consumer’s Purchase History

大数据时代,平台企业通过对消费者画像实现针对不同类型消费者的个性化产品推荐和差别定价的现象屡屡发生。将企业的这种精准推荐产品和服务行为以消费者效用的形式纳入豪特林模型中,分析双寡头企业进行差别定价的动机并比较分析不同定价方式下的福利。研究结果表明:在双寡头市场竞争中,与统一定价相比,企业的差别定价行为会降低企业利润,但能提高企业的市场份额,当双寡头企业采取不对称定价策略时,进行差别定价的一方在市场份额竞争中取得优势;当双寡头企业采取有技术差距的差别定价时,技术领先的一方在市场份额竞争中取得优势。与直觉相反,研究表明,差别定价并不总是损害消费者福利。由此,有关部门不应盲目干预差别定价行为,但要关注企业通过差别定价进行无序扩张行为,从而避免企业形成市场支配地位后进行不正当竞争、谋取利益等乱象的发生。

In the era of big data,platforms enterprises have realized personalized product recommendation and differential pricing for different types of consumers through consumer portraits.In this paper,the precise recommendation of products and services behavior of enterprises is incorporated into the Hotelling model in the form of consumer utility to analyze the motivation of duopoly enterprises to perform differential pricing and compare the welfare under different pricing methods.The results show that,in duopoly market competition,compared with unified pricing,the differential pricing behavior of the enterprise will reduce the profits of enterprises,but can increase the market share of enterprises,when the duopoly adopts asymmetric pricing strategy,the one with differential pricing has the advantage in market share competition.When the duopoly adopts the differential pricing with technology gap,the party with the leading technology has the advantage in market share competition.Counterintuitively,differential pricing does not always harm the welfare of consumers.Therefore,relevant departments should not blindly intervene in differential pricing,but should pay attention to the disorderly expansion of enterprises through differential pricing,so as to avoid the occurrence of unfair competition and profit after the formation of dominant market position.