基于系统动力学模型的港口危化品运输管理演化博弈

Hazardous chemical transportation management evolutionary game in ports based on system dynamics model

针对港口危化品运输管理中存在的安全问题,采用演化博弈理论,构建政府监管部门与危化品港口企业间的演化博弈模型,研究双方在博弈过程中的策略选择。在建立惩罚机制的基础上考虑双方期望损失对系统均衡的影响,结合系统动力学模型分析不同参数变化下的演化结果。研究表明:危化品港口企业违法运输的额外收益是影响其策略选择的直接因素。提高双方违规操作的期望损失,可以促进系统向着理想稳定点演化。降低监管成本、增加监管收益可以提高监管部门的积极性。合理长效的惩罚机制能有效促使危化品港口企业进行守法运输,同时也可以提高监管部门的监管效益。研究结论可为打造良性、可持续的运输安全监管体系提供理论支撑。

Aiming at the safety problems in the hazardous chemical transportation management in ports,the evolutionary game theory is used to construct an evolutionary game model between government regulatory authorities and hazardous chemical port enterprises,and study the strategic choice of both parties in the game process.The impact of the expected losses of both parties on the system equilibrium is considered on the basis of establishing a punishment mechanism,and the evolution results under different parameter changes are analyzed in combination with the system dynamics model.Studies show that the additional benefit of illegal transportation of hazardous chemical port enterprises is the direct factor affecting their strategic choice.Increasing the expected loss of non-compliance operations on both parties can promote the evolution of the system towards the ideal stability point.Reducing regulatory costs and increasing regulatory revenues can increase the enthusiasm of regulatory authorities.A reasonable and long-term punishment mechanism can effectively promote the law-abiding transportation of hazardous chemical port enterprises,and can also improve the regulatory efficiency of regulatory authorities.The research conclusions can provide theoretical support for building a benign and sustainable transport safety supervision system.