大股东股权质押与企业的低质量并购

Equity Pledge of Controlling Shareholders and Low-quality Mergers and Acquisitions of Enterprises

大股东股权质押行为会刺激上市公司的风险决策。以2003-2019年中国沪深两市非国有上市公司为样本,考察大股东股权质押对企业并购决策的影响。研究发现:大股东股权质押会驱动上市公司发起并购,尤其是关联并购、现金支付方式并购和匹配募资的并购;大股东股权质押驱动下的并购支付溢价更高,且并购后的业绩更差,计提商誉减值的概率更高;上述效应在上市公司面临融资约束、权力集中、大股东投票权与现金流权分离和较弱的外部监督时更为明显。结果表明,基于掏空动机,大股东融资约束会驱动上市公司发起低质量的并购。

The equity pledge behavior of controlling shareholders can stimulate the risk decision-making of listed companies.Taking the non-state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2003 to 2019 as samples,the paper examines the impact of equity pledge of controlling shareholders on the mergers and acquisitions decisions of companies.The study finds that equity pledge of controlling shareholders will drive listed firms to initiate mergers and acquisitions(M&As),especially M&As with related parties,cash payment M&As,and matching fundraising.M&As driven by the equity pledge of controlling shareholders have higher payment premiums,worse post-merger performance,and higher probability of accrual goodwill impairment.These effects are more significant when listed firms face financing constraints,concentration of power,separation of voting rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders,and weak external supervision.The results show that based on the motivation of tunneling,the financing constraints of controlling shareholders will drive listed firms to initiate low-quality M&As.