摘要
公司领办合作社的实质是由纯投资者和惠顾者共有合作社。基于汉斯曼的企业所有权分析框架,投资者与惠顾者共有合作社会导致极高的所有权成本,违背了企业所有权配置的基本规律,这是公司领办的合作社难以“规范”的根本原因。国内外合作社发展经验和典型案例表明:首先,农业合作社大多出现在社员利益一致性较高、比较容易协调的领域;其次,提高社员间利益一致性的努力一直在引领合作社的制度创新;再次,美国将纯外部投资者引入合作社的“有限合作社”模式创新失败;最后,国内某农机合作社的发展案例表明,即使是事先设计好的、被认为非常规范的公司领办的合作社最终也会走向异化。以上经验都支持保持社员利益一致性是合作社可持续发展的必要前提。中国政府应当正视公司领办的合作社不规范问题的根源,如果确需引入纯投资者,就应该在投资者和惠顾者之间划定清晰的界限,服从不同的所有权安排。
This paper delves into the difficulties encountered in regulating company-led cooperatives and examines the underlying reasons.Drawing upon the framework of enterprise ownership analysis developed by Dr.Henry Hansmann,the study reveals that the essence of company-led cooperatives lies in the shared ownership between pure investors and patrons.However,this unique ownership arrangement gives rise to exorbitant ownership costs and undermines the fundamental principles of enterprise ownership allocation.The analysis also includes empirical evidence from both domestic and international cooperative development experiences and showcases how the consistency of membersinterests is a prerequisite for sustaining cooperatives.In light of these findings,the Chinese government is urged to address the root causes of regulatory irregularities in company-led cooperatives.Moreover,if pure investors are to be introduced,a clear demarcation must be established between investor members and patron members in accordance with diverse ownership arrangements.
出处
《南京农业大学学报(社会科学版)》
北大核心
2023年第5期105-118,共14页
Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“政府支持对农民专业合作社发展的影响与政策调适研究”(20BJY134)。