基于博弈理论的碳减排服务供应链收益共享契约研究

Research on Revenue Sharing Contract ofCarbon Emission Reduction Service Supply Chain Based on Game Theory

为提高碳减排效率,制造商往往选择与碳减排服务商合作.运用博弈理论构建了收益共享契约模型,研究了制造商和服务商之间的最优收益共享契约设计的问题.通过数值分析,研究了消费者低碳偏好程度和商品价格对收益共享契约的影响.研究结果表明:制造商会要求服务商支付一定的减排保证金;在不同的消费者低碳偏好程度和商品价格下,制造商和服务商会选择不同的策略以实现最优减排合作.本研究不仅丰富了低碳服务供应链理论研究,还为制造商和服务商合作减排时,如何选择收益共享契约最优策略提供重要的现实指导.

To improve carbon emission reduction efficiency,manufacturers often choose to cooperate with low-carbon technology service providers.The article uses game theory to construct a revenue sharing contract model and studies the optimal revenue sharing contract design between manufacturers and service providers.Through numerical analysis,the impact of consumer low-carbon preference and commodity prices on revenue sharing contracts is studied.The research results indicate that manufacturers require service providers to pay a certain emission reduction deposit,and manufacturers and service providers choose different strategies to achieve optimal emission reduction cooperation under different levels of consumer low-carbon preferences and commodity prices.This study not only enriches the theoretical research on low-carbon service supply chain,but also provides important practical guidance for manufacturers and service providers to choose the optimal strategy for revenue sharing contracts when collaborating on emission reduction.