机构跨区域持股降低了省际资本流动壁垒吗?

Does Institutional Cross-regional Shareholding Lower the Barrier to Inter-provincial Capital Flows?

省际资本流动壁垒成为构建全国统一大市场的重要阻碍,而普遍存在的机构跨区域持股现象为增强异地并购促进资本跨区域流动提供了可能。文章从企业异地并购视角切入,基于共同所有权理论与区位理论,分别构建垄断市场和竞争市场机构跨区域持股影响企业异地投资决策的理论模型,并借助2005—2020年异地并购数据,实证检验机构跨区域持股对省际资本流动壁垒的影响机理。研究表明:目标地市场垄断程度较高时,机构跨区域持股降低了异地并购发生的概率,提高了省际资本流动壁垒,发挥了市场分割作用;目标地市场垄断程度较低时,机构跨区域持股提高了异地并购发生的概率,降低了省际资本流动壁垒,发挥了市场整合作用。进一步研究发现,目标地市场垄断程度较高时,机构跨区域持股能够通过退出威胁提高省际资本流动壁垒,而并购方企业的信息透明度与异地并购经验能够缓解这种不利影响;目标地市场垄断程度较低时,机构跨区域持股通过减少交易成本降低省际资本流动壁垒,能够为提升异地并购的长期绩效提供保障。文章为揭示资本跨区域流动的微观影响机理提供了经验证据,对引导共同机构股东降低省际资本流动壁垒、激发国内循环动力具有重要启示。

The barrier to inter-provincial capital flows has become an important obstacle to building a unified national market,and the widespread phenomenon of institutional cross-regional shareholding provides the possibility to enhance cross-regional M&A to promote capital flows across regions.However,based on the perspective of collusive monopoly,institutional crossregional shareholding may also prevent enterprises from cross-regional M&A to maintain monopoly profits,which becomes an implicit bottleneck in the process of building a unified national market.Therefore,in order to clarify the role of institutional cross-regional shareholding on the barrier to inter-provincial capital flows,this paper studies from the perspective of crossregional M&A and develops a theoretical model.Within the model,the process of institutional cross-regional shareholding affecting the remote investment decision of enterprises in monopoly market and competitive market is described respectively.Then,using the data from cross-regional M&A of listed companies from 2005 to 2020,this paper empirically examines the mechanism by which institutional cross-regional shareholding affects the constraints on cross-provincial capital flows.Finally,this paper further explores the influence mechanism of institutional cross-regional shareholding on cross-regional M&A from three aspects:impact channel,mitigation method,and economic consequences.The conclusions show that institutional inter-regional shareholding reduces the likelihood of cross-regional M&A when the monopoly degree of the target market is high,increases the barrier to inter-provincial capital flows,and serves as a market segmentation mechanism.However,when the monopoly degree of the target market is low,institutional interregional shareholding boosts the likelihood of cross-regional M&A,lowers the barrier to interprovincial capital flows,and serves as a unified market.Further study reveals that institutional cross-regional shareholding strengthens the barrier to inter-provincial capital flows through the threat of withdrawal when the target market has a high degree of monopoly,but the negative impact can be mitigated by the information transparency of the acquirer and the experience of cross-regional M&A.Additionally,institutional inter-regional shareholding lowers the barrier to inter-provincial capital flows by lowering transaction costs when the monopoly degree of the target market is low,which can serve as a guarantee for the long-term performance improvement of cross-regional M&A.Based on the different target market structure,this paper studies the governance process of institutional inter-regional shareholding involved in cross-regional M&A from both theoretical and empirical aspects.It not only offers empirical support for identifying the micro-influence mechanism of cross-provincial capital flows,but also has significant implications for advising institutional investors on how to encourage inter-regional capital flows and rev up the internal forces that drive domestic circulation.