基于演化博弈的“双边-集中”电力市场交易机制研究

An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach to Analyze"Bilateral-Centralized"Power Market

鼓励发电厂和大用户签订长期稳定的双边合同是新一轮电力体制改革的重要举措之一。为探究改革措施的有效性,论文使用演化博弈理论对考虑了双边交易模式的电力交易模式进行建模分析,构建了发电厂和大用户的电力供需模型,并对发电厂的市场竞争演化过程及均衡状态进行讨论与分析。根据大用户刚性需求电量和市场均衡电量之间的大小关系确定了四种供需情境,并利用复制动态理论求出市场的演化均衡结果。结果表明:在不同类型供需情境下,引入双边协商交易制度未必一定会提升市场平均利润;在市场供需确定情况下,发电厂在双边市场的保留价格会影响市场总体利润水平。

Encouraging power plants and large users to sign long-term stable bilateral contracts is one of the important measures of the power system reform in China.In order to explore its effectiveness,evolutionary game theory is adopted to model the power trading mechanism considering bilateral trading model,the power supply and demand model of power plants and large users is constructed,and the evolutionary process of market competition and equilibrium state of power plants is discussed.The model discusses four supply and demand scenarios according to the relationship between the rigid demand quantity of large users and the market equilibrium quantity,and uses the replicator dynamic theory to obtain the evolutionary stable state of the market.The results show that under different supply and demand scenarios,the introduction of bilateral transac⁃tion system may not necessarily improve the average profit of the market;under the determined market supply and demand,the reserved price of the power plant in the bilateral market will affect the overall profit level of the market.