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全媒体时代基于微分博弈的网络舆情引导激励机制研究 被引量:5

Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Network Public Opinion Guidance Based on Differential Game in the Omnimedia Era
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摘要 全媒体时代赋予了网络舆情独特的传播特征,也对其监管与治理提出了更高的要求。鉴于此,探索有效的网络舆情引导策略与激励机制对营造健康的舆论生态具有重要意义。考虑到网络舆情传播的动态性与持续性,结合网络舆情实际传播过程及借助微分博弈的研究范式,本文构建了由监管主体、网媒、网民构成的5种网络舆情传播情境;通过求解不同情境下各主体的均衡策略,进而分析网络舆情的传播引导效果,识别网络舆情引导过程中的关键参数。研究结果表明,双激励并存策略情境下的网络舆情引导效果最佳,可实现系统整体收益的帕累托最优;无激励策略情境下,网络舆情引导效果处于最低水平;显性激励和隐性激励策略均可有效改善网络舆情引导效果,但存在差异化的影响强度:φM>ω>φN。 With the rapid development of artificial intelligence technology,the era of omnimedia has arrived.Network public opinion propagation has been endowed with new and unique characteristics,which also puts forward higher requirements for its guidance and governance.Therefore,it is of great significance to explore effective network public opinion guidance strategies and incentive mechanisms to build a healthy public opinion ecology.Considering the dynamic and sustainable propagation of network public opinion,combined with the actual propagation process and the research paradigm of differential game,five kinds of network public opinion propagation scenarios composed of regulator,media and netizens are constructed.By solving the equilibrium strategy of each subject,the propagation process and guiding effect of network public opinion under different incentive scenarios are theoretically analyzed.Combined with the simulation experiment,the influence of differ⁃ent guidance methods on the propagation and guidance effect of network public opinion is deeply analyzed,and then the key parameters in the guidance process of network public opinion are identified.The results show that the network public opinion guidance effect is the best under the dual incentive policy scenario,which can realize the Pareto optimization of the overall system income.And the network public opinion guidance effect is at the lowest level under the non-incentive policy scenario.It is worth noting that both explicit incentive and implicit incentive policies can effectively improve the guiding effect of network public opinions,but there are different intensity of influence:φM(the cost subsidy coefficient provided by the regulator to the media)≻ω(implicit incen⁃tive coefficient)≻φN(the cost subsidy coefficient provided by the regulator to the netizens).
作者 侯艳辉 管敏 王家坤 孟帆 张昊 HOU Yan-hui;GUAN Min;WANG Jia-kun;MENG Fan;ZHANG Hao(College of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Shandong Qingdao 266500,China)
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2023年第8期239-252,共14页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2021QG035) 山东省社会科学规划研究项目(22DGLJ27,20CGLJ21) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71902105) 青岛市社会科学规划研究项目(QDSKL2201115)。
关键词 网络舆情 全媒体时代 微分博弈 引导策略 激励机制 network public opinion omnimedia era differential game guidance strategy incentive mechanism
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