薪酬-级别倒挂与公司慈善捐赠

Salary-Rank Inversion and Corporate Charitable Donations

公司的慈善捐赠是直接增进社会福利的有效手段,探究公司捐赠决策的行为逻辑具有重要意义。基于2015—2019年国有企业集团下属A股上市公司数据,考察了公司高管获得高于其所属集团负责人薪酬的薪酬—级别倒挂现象对慈善捐赠的影响。研究发现:薪酬—级别倒挂会促使公司高管出于迎合集团的动机增加慈善捐赠,即薪酬—级别倒挂程度越高,公司的慈善捐赠水平越高。区分慈善捐赠性质的检验表明,薪酬—级别倒挂影响下的捐赠主要是非连续、策略性捐赠,支持了迎合假说。进一步分析发现,迎合动机强烈、迎合难度更高以及迎合效果更好时,薪酬—级别倒挂对公司慈善捐赠的影响更明显。因此,国有企业集团在激励下属公司积极承担社会责任时,可以将其相应的考核机制与薪酬体系结合,从而实现更好的激励效果。

Corporate charitable donations serve as an effective means of directly enhancing social welfare,making it significant to explore the behavioral logic behind corporate donation decisions.This study leverages data from A-share listed companies affiliated with state-owned enterprise groups from 2015 to 2019 to explore how the phenomenon of“salary-rank inversion”,where the salary of executives surpasses that of group leaders,affects corporate charitable donations.The study finds that salary-rank inversion motivates corporate executives to increase charitable donations to cater to the groups.In other words,higher levels of salary-rank inversion lead to higher levels of corporate charitable donations.Upon distinguishing the nature of charitable donations,the examination reveals that donations under the influence of salary-rank inversion are mainly discontinuous and tactical,thus the hypothesis that companies cater to SOE groups is supported.Further analysis shows that the effect of salary-rank inversion on corporate charitable donations is more obvious when the motivation to cater to SOE groups is stronger,the difficulty of catering is higher,or the result of catering is better.As a result,when state-owned enterprise groups encourage their subsidiary companies to actively undertake social responsibilities,integrating corresponding performance assessment mechanisms with salary systems can lead to better incentive effects.