双渠道下考虑网络外部性的制造商优惠券投放策略研究

Couponing Strategies of Manufacturers Considering Network Externality under Dual Channels

在考虑网络外部性与消费者偏好共同影响消费者购买决策的基础上,构建由单个制造商与单个零售商组成两级供应链的Stackelberg博弈模型,对比分析制造商不同的优惠券投放策略(不投放、仅线下投放、仅线上投放和同时投放),探讨双渠道下制造商的优惠券投放策略及其对零售商的影响。研究表明:制造商投放面值较大的优惠券才能增加自身利润;制造商的优惠券投放策略同时受到网络外部性折扣系数、消费者对线上渠道的偏好程度以及优惠券面值大小等因素的影响,而制造商选择仅线上投放或同时投放面值较大的优惠券优于不投放或仅线下投放优惠券;零售商总是能从制造商投放优惠券中获益,呈“搭便车”效应。

Considering the impacts of network externality and consumers’preferences for the online channel on their purchasing decisions,this paper builds a Stackelberg game model in a two-stage supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer.We aim to explore the optimal pricing decisions and profits of the two parties in the presence of different couponing strategies(i.e.,no delivery,offline delivery only,online delivery only,and offline and online delivery),and analyze the impact of the manufacturer’s optimal couponing strategy on the retailer in dual channels.Our main results suggest that:The manufacturer should deliver large denomination coupons to increase its profit.The manufacturer’s optimal couponing strategy is strongly affected by the network externality discount coefficient,consumers’preference for the online channel,and denomination coupons.In fact,delivering coupons to the online channel only or both channels with relatively large denomination is better than no coupon delivery or delivering coupons to the offline channel only.The retailer can always enjoy free riding and benefit from the coupon delivery of the manufacturer.