三方博弈视角下供应商社会责任审查策略研究

Research on the Audit Strategies of the Supplier Social Responsibility from the Perspective of Tripartite Game

分别构建政府单独审查、政府与核心企业独立审查、合作审查博弈模型,探讨核心企业参与审查的条件以及参与审查时的最优审查机制选择。研究表明:①当政府面临的潜在损失大时,核心企业不参与审查;当政府面临的潜在损失小时,若供应商合规意愿低,核心企业参与独立审查,否则参与合作审查。②相较于政府单独审查,核心企业参与合作审查将提高供应商合规水平;而参与独立审查只有在政府面临的潜在损失小时,才能提高供应商合规水平,即核心企业参与审查并不总能提高供应商合规水平。此外,通过数值实验分析了重要参数对最优策略的影响。

This study constructs three game models of the government-only audit,the government-focal firm independent audit,and the joint audit to explore the conditions under which the focal firm participates in the audit and the selection of the optimal audit mechanism when it participates in the audit.The results show that,firstly,when the government faces a high potential loss,the focal firm will not participate in the audit.When the government faces a low potential loss,the focal firm will participate in the independent audit if the supplier has a low compliance willingness,otherwise,it will participate in the joint audit.Secondly,compared to the government-only audit,the focal firm’s participation in the joint audit will improve the supplier’s compliance level,while in the independent audit,it will improve the compliance level only when the government faces a low potential loss.That is,the participation of the focal firm in the audit does not always improve the compliance level of the supplier.Furthermore,the impact of important parameters on the optimal strategies is also investigated through numerical experiments.