企业关系型合约中的高能力员工与生产安全治理

Highly Capable Employees and Production Safety Management in Enterprise Relational Contracts

在企业委托人与代理人之间的正式合约之外还存在着能够执行但无法验证的关系型合约,现有文献对关系型合约的研究主要集中在如何提高企业产品质量和生产效率,缺少关系型合约如何影响企业生产安全的研究。文章在文献评述的基础上,提炼出三个研究命题,并通过对三个国内外关系型合约与企业生产安全的案例分析,验证了相关命题。由此得出三点结论:(1)在企业委托人与代理人之间的正式合约之外还存在着关系型合约,且高能力的代理人对生产安全关系型合约的履行起着决定性作用;(2)在企业生产安全关系型合约中存在着多重道德风险,经过重复博弈,由高能力员工取代低能力员工形成一对二的委托代理关系,能够克服多重道德风险;(3)在企业中构建基于高能力员工的关系知识传递-接收-扩散机制,有利于提高企业生产安全治理水平。本研究拓展了企业生产安全治理的新视角,具有重要意义。

In addition to formal contracts between corporate principals and agents,there are also relational contracts that can be executed but unverifiable.Existing documents on relational contracts mainly focuses on how to improve product quality and production efficiency of enterprises,but no research on how relational contracts affect production safety in enterprises.Based on literature review,three research propositions are summarized in this paper to verify the relevant propositions through three case studies of relational contracts and enterprise production safety at home and abroad.We work out three conclusions as follows:(1)Apart from the formal contracts between the principal and agent,there are also relational contracts in enterprises,and highly capable agents play a decisive role in performing relational contracts of production safety.(2)In the relational contracts of production safety in enterprises,there are multiple moral risks for employees with low ability.After repeated games,a"one to two"principal-agent relationship is established in the form of low ability replacing employees with highly capable employees.(3)Building a relationship knowledge transmission,reception,and diffusion mechanism based on highly capable employees in enterprises can fix multiple moral hazard and improve the level of enterprise production safety management.This paper expands a new perspective on enterprise production safety management,which is of great significance as well.