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数字化能力差异下的企业基于行为定价研究

Behavior-based Pricing in Firms with Differentiated Digital Capabilities
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摘要 本文在竞争性企业的数字化能力存在差异的情况下,研究了企业基于行为定价(BBP)策略会如何影响各方的均衡价格、收益以及策略选择。本文基于Hotelling模型构建了竞争市场下的两期定价博弈,通过对比各方的定价和收益变化情况,得到以下主要结论。(1)企业第二期的均衡状态受第一期市场份额和数字化能力差距的共同影响,存在三种可能的均衡状况。同时,在第二期的均衡中,存在老顾客价格低于新顾客价格的情况;(2)当第一期市场份额差异较大时,BBP策略的实施会同时提高两家企业的第二期利润,然而第一期市场份额较大的企业在第二期的利润反而会低于竞争对手;(3)在两家企业的数字化能力差异足够大或足够小的情况下,才存在纯策略均衡,并且只有在两家企业的数字化能力差异较大时,数字化能力较强的企业能够实现单方猎取对方的顾客,进而摆脱BBP策略带来的囚徒困境,实现利润增长。 Considering the differences of firms’digital capabilities,this paper studies how behavior-based pricing(BBP)affects pricing decisions,profits and strategy choices of both firms.We use Hotelling model to construct a two-period pricing model in a competitive market.By comparing prices and profits of both firms,the study reaches the following conclusions:(1)the equilibrium of the second period is jointly affected by the market share in the first period and digital capabilities gap,which leads to three possible equilibriums.Meanwhile,in the equilibrium of the second period,the price for current customers may be lower than that for new customers;(2)when the market share gap in the first period is large,BBP increases the profits of both firms in the second period.However,the profit of firm that shares a larger market in the first period is lower than the firm's competitor in the second period;(3)a pure strategy equilibrium exists,when the digital capability gap is large enough or small enough.Further,when the digital capability gap is large enough,the advantage firm can get new customers,which help it get rid of the prisoner's dilemma brought by BBP and achieve profit growth.
作者 滕文波 王振宇 高鑫 Teng Wenbo;Wang Zhenyu;Cao Xin(OThe School of Business Administration,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics)
出处 《营销科学学报》 CSSCI 2023年第4期60-78,共19页 Journal of Marketing Science
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目(编号:72272021) 辽宁省教育厅项目(编号:LN2020J32) 中央高校基本科研业务费项目(编号:3132023287)的资助。
关键词 基于行为定价 数字化能力 HOTELLING模型 非对称竞争市场 behavior-based pricing digital capability Hotelling model asymmetric market
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