摘要
古典自然法学派的诸贤哲们使用的“权利(right)”一语具有多义性,其包括:霍布斯的“本能自由”,洛克的“本益禁侵”,卢梭、康德的“公意自由”。其中,以“自由”为本义的权利观念是这一学派的主导性权利观念。但这一权利观经历了由霍布斯的基于人的自然本有能力的自由向卢梭、康德的体现为公共意志的理性约束下的自由的观念转换。从理论逻辑来看,卢梭、康德的公意自由观是古典自然法学中更为成熟、完善的权利观念,因其中内含着“正义”“正当”的意思,所以,它看起来更像是“权利”。至于洛克开创的以“应当不”为本义的权利观,指向保护主体本有利益(“本益禁侵”)。这种“权利”(“应当不”)并不指向主体的自我行为,而是指向他方(其他个人、或社会、或国家)的行为:是对他方行为的禁止。它实质上是义务表述。
The term“right”used by the philosophers of the school of classical natural law jurispru⁃dence is polysemous,including Hobbes'“freedom of faculty”,Locke's“prohibition of infringement of natu⁃ral interests”,Rousseau's and Kant's“freedom of public will”.Among them,the concept of right with“freedom”as its original meaning is the dominant concept of right of this school.However,this concept of right has experienced the transformation from Hobbes'freedom based on human's natural capacities to Rousseau's and Kant's freedom under the rational constraint of public will.From the perspective of theoreti⁃cal logic,Rousseau's and Kant's concept of freedom of public will is a more mature and complete concept of right in classical natural law jurisprudence,because it contains the meaning of“justice”and“justification”.Therefore,it looks more like“right”.As for Locke's concept of right,which takes“ought not”as the o⁃riginal meaning,it points to the protection of the subject's natural interests(“prohibition of infringement of natural interests”).This“right”(“ought not”)does not point to the subject's own conduct,but to the conduct of another party(another individual,society,or state):it is a prohibition against the conduct of another party.It's essentially a statement of obligation.
作者
张恒山
ZHANG Heng-shan(Tianjin University Law School,Tianjin 300072)
出处
《行政法学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第5期3-25,共23页
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
基金
2022年度研究阐释党的十九届六中全会精神国家社科基金重大项目“弘扬社会主义法治精神”(项目编号:22ZDA072)。
关键词
权利
自然权利
本能自由
本益禁侵
公意自由
Right
Natural Right
Freedom of Faculty
Prohibition of Infringement of Natural Inter⁃ests
Freedom of Public Will