国有股东如何化解民营企业股权质押危机?——对国有股东“用脚投票”治理机制的实证检验

How can State-Owned Shareholders Resolve the Equity Pledge Crisis of Private Enterprises?An Empirical Test of the Governance Mechanism of“Voting with One’s Feet”by State-Owned Shareholders

国有资本入股是目前化解民营企业股权质押危机的重要方式,体现了国有资本在抗风险方面发挥的重要作用,但国有股东在抗风险过程中是否发挥治理作用尚不清晰。本文基于2014-2021年沪深A股民营上市公司样本,发现国有股东通过显著提高民营企业的股权质押解除率化解资本市场的股权质押危机,这种作用在企业控制权与所有权分离程度越大、国有股东“退出威胁”的可信度越高和退出的潜在影响程度越大时越显著,该结果证明国有股东是通过“用脚投票”的治理机制发挥作用的。进一步研究发现,国有股东参股与相关正式制度之间具有互补关系;经济后果方面,国有股东降低了股权质押导致的盈余管理,降低了参股企业股价崩盘风险并增加了参股企业的盈利能力,长期来看显著提升了高质押企业的价值。本文揭示了国有股东化解民营企业股权质押危机的作用机理,为国有资本的公司治理功能提供了实证证据。

Introducing state-owned shareholders is currently an important way to resolve the equity pledge crisis of private enterprises,which reflects the important role played by state-owned capital in resisting risks.However,it remains unclear whether state-owned shareholders play a governance role in the process of resisting risks.Based on the sample of A-share listed private enterprises on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2021,the paper finds that state-owned shareholders resolve the equity pledge crisis in the capital market by significantly increasing the equity pledge release rate of private enterprises.This effect is more significant when the degree of separation between corporate control and ownership is greater,the credibility of the“threat of exit”by state-owned shareholders is higher,and the degree of potential impact of exit is greater.This result demonstrates that state-owned shareholders play a role through the governance mechanism of“voting with one’s feet.”Further research finds that there is a complementary relation between the participation of state-owned shareholders and the relevant regulatory policies.In terms of economic consequences,state-owned shareholders reduce surplus management caused by equity pledges,mitigate the stock price crash risk of participating enterprises,and increase the profitability of participating enterprises,which significantly increase the value of highly pledged enterprises in the long run.This study reveals the mechanism by which state-owned shareholders resolve the equity pledge crisis of private enterprises and provides empirical evidence for the corporate governance function of state-owned capital.