协同视角下的高排放企业碳减排三方演化博弈分析

Analysis of Tripartite Evolutionary Game of High Emission Enterprises'Carbon Emission Reduction from the Perspective of Synergy

目的 为了探究我国经济社会发展中面临的碳减排问题。方法 基于系统稳定性视角,采用演化博弈方法,构建了碳减排过程中高排放企业、地方政府和第三方组织的三方演化博弈模型,运用MATLAB工具对三方的交互行为进行数值模拟仿真,分析各参数变化对系统演化结果的影响。结果 分析发现:降低企业减排成本、政府监管成本以及提高碳减排间接收益、碳排放权收益均能够有效提升企业选择减排行为的概率,但提升的效果均呈现先增强后减弱的变化趋势;相对于惩罚,企业对政府的减排补贴更加敏感。结论 提升对第三方组织的资助力度以及降低曝光成本对企业碳减排行为的优化具有积极作用。

Objective To explore the problem of carbon emission reduction in our economic and social development.Methods Based on the perspective of system stability,this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of high emission enterprises,local governments and third-party organizations in the process of carbon emission reduction by using the evolutionary game method.The interaction behavior of the three parties is numerically simulated by using MATLAB tool,and the influence of the change of various parameters on the result of system evolution is analyzed.Results Through analysis,it was found that reducing the cost of enterprise emission reduction,government regulatory costs,as well as increasing the indirect benefits of carbon emission reduction and carbon emission rights benefits,can effectively increase the probability of enterprises choosing emission reduction behavior,but the improvement effect shows a trend of first increasing and then weakening;Compared to punishment,companies are more sensitive to government emission reduction subsidies.Conclusion Improving the funding for third-party organizations and reducing exposure costs play a positive role in the optimization of enterprises'carbon emission reduction behavior.