产学研深度融合动态演化博弈机制研究——基于创新过程视角

Research on Dynamic Evolution Game Mechanism of University‐industry Research Deep Integration:Based on the Perspective of Innovation Process

产学研深度融合是完善我国科技创新体制机制系列部署中的关键环节,但现有研究未体现出深度融合过程的动态性、阶段性及多主体性等特征。鉴于此,将过程阶段思想引入产学研机制中,构建多方参与的产学研深度融合演化博弈模型,分析创新主体的策略选择,并用Matlab软件对主体行为策略的演化过程进行仿真研究。结果表明:地方政府的资金支持、政策支持及合理的惩罚机制均有助于深度融合,但是过多的资金支持会弱化地方政府的引导效应;基于相对风险分担的收益分配机制相比于平均分配、成本分配机制更符合创新主体的利益诉求;通过深度融合既能降低创新过程中的不确定性风险又能实现风险分担。最后,针对产学研深度融合机制的构建提出相关建议。

The university-industry research deep integration is a key link in the series of deployments to improve China’s science and technology innovation system mechanism,but the existing research does not reflect the dynamic,stage,and multi-subject characteristics of the deep integration process.In view of this,the idea of the innovation process stages was introduced into the establishment of the mechanism of U-I relations,and a multi-party evolutionary game model of U-IR deep integration was contracted.Based on the three-party evolutionary game theory,the strategy selection of the participants during the U-IR deep integration process was further analyzed and the evolution of each party’s strategy was studied by simulation using Matlab software.The main results show that both financial support and policy support by the local governments are conducive to the IUR deep integration,but,excessive financial support weakens the guiding effect of the government.Reasonable punishment mechanisms can enhance the willingness of innovation subjects to continue to participate in deep integration.Compared with the average distribution mechanism and the cost-based distribution mechanism,the revenue allocation based on relative risk sharing is more in line with the interests of innovation subjects.Since deep integration can reduce the uncertainty risks in the innovation process and realize risk sharing,the integration subject will tend to deeply integrate.Finally,relevant suggestions are made for the construction of the U-IR deep integration mechanism.