协同治理抑或合谋掏空:非控股股东网络与企业并购效率

Coordination in governance or tunneling in collusion:Non-controlling shareholders' network and M&A efficiency

实证考察非控股股东网络对企业并购效率的影响。研究发现:非控股股东网络中心度越高,并购发起可能性越低但绩效越高,支持协同治理效应假说。进一步研究发现:提高并购效率的主要是压力抵制型机构投资者网络和个人投资者网络;非控股股东网络提高了并购能力,抑制了控股股东机会主义行为;法制环境和股权结构具有调节作用。

This paper investigates the impact of non-controlling shareholders' network on the MA efficiency.We find that the higher the network centrality of non-controlling shareholders,the lower the probability of launching MA,but the higher quality of MA performance,which supports the hypothesis of Coordination in Governance Effect.Further researches find that pressure resistant institutional investors ' network and individual investors ' network mainly contribute to the improvement in MA efficiency;the non-controlling shareholders' network improves the ability of MA and mitigates the opportunistic behavior of controlling shareholders;the legal environment and ownership structure have the moderating effect.