避税天堂直接投资、代理成本与投资效率

Direct Investment in Tax Havens,Agency Costs,and Investment Efficiency

在经济全球化背景下,越来越多的跨国公司通过在避税天堂进行投资建立子公司等分支机构来参与全球经济活动。避税天堂一般具有低税收、缺乏信息交换、信息不透明等特征,会导致税基侵蚀和利润转移的不公平经济环境。因此,这一现象引起了政府部门和学术界的高度重视。以2009年至2019年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,采用Logit回归模型,实证检验避税天堂直接投资对公司投资效率的影响,基于第1类代理成本和第2类代理成本的视角考察其作用机制,并检验融资约束、产权性质和政治关联的调节效应。在进一步分析中检验避税天堂直接投资对公司绩效的影响,以及内外部公司治理机制的治理作用。研究结果表明,拥有避税天堂直接投资的公司其投资效率显著更低,原因在于避税天堂直接投资会增加公司的第1类代理成本,进而降低投资效率。虽然避税天堂直接投资也会增加公司的第2类代理成本,但第2类代理成本并没有发挥中介作用。异质性分析表明,在受融资约束程度高的公司、非国有公司以及没有政治关联的公司中,避税天堂直接投资对非效率投资的影响更严重。进一步研究还发现,拥有避税天堂直接投资的上市公司其过度投资和投资不足的程度都显著更高,尤其是过度投资问题更为突出。此外,避税天堂直接投资对投资效率的负面影响不仅具有持续性,还会进一步损害公司绩效,而良好的公司治理有助于缓解避税天堂直接投资对投资效率的负面影响。研究结果丰富了有关避税天堂直接投资的相关研究,为深刻理解避税天堂直接投资的危害及其原因提供新的经验证据,为公司决策者意识到避税天堂直接投资的“双重性”提供参考借鉴,在实践中对完善中国的避税天堂直接投资监管、规范上市公司避税天堂直接投资行为具有一定的指导意义。

In the context of economic globalization,more and more multinational companies participate in global economic activities by investing in tax haven to establish subsidiaries and branches.Tax haven are generally characterized by low taxes,lack of information exchange,and opaque information,which will lead to an unfair economic environment of tax base erosion and profit transfer,and will also reduce the information transparency of investment companies and exacerbate the agency problems.Therefore,this phenomenon deserves high attention from government departments and academia.This study applies Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2019 as the research sample,and uses the Logit regression model to empirically test the impact of direct investment in tax havens on corporate investment efficiency.From the perspectives of the first type of agency cost and the second type of agency cost,this study examines its influencing mechanism,and the moderating effects of financing constraints,property rights and political connections.In the further analysis,we test the impact of direct investment in tax havens on corporate performance,as well as the governance role of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms.The findings show that firms with direct investment in tax havens have significantly lower investment efficiency.The reason is that direct investment in tax havens increases a firm′s first type of agency cost,which further reduces the firm′s investment efficiency.Although direct investment in tax havens also increases the second type of agency cost,it does not play an intermediary role.Heterogeneity analysis shows that,the negative impact of direct investment in tax havens on investment efficiency is stronger in firms with higher financial constraints,non-state owned firms,and firms with no political connection.Further research shows that direct investment in tax havens exacerbates both over investment and underinvestment,in particular,the issue of over investment is more prominent.In addition,the negative impact of direct investment in tax havens on investment efficiency exists for the following three periods,and further damages firm performance.Good corporate governance helps to alleviate the negative impact of direct investment in tax havens on investment efficiency.This study enriches the relevant literature on direct investment in tax havens,and provides new empirical evidence for a deeper understanding of the hazards and causes of direct investment in tax havens.The research results provide a reference for enterprise decision-makers to realize the “duality” of direct investment in tax havens,and have a certain guiding significance in practice to improve the investment supervision of tax haven and standardize the behavior of listed companies′ direct investment in tax havens.