探赜与诘难:笛卡尔美德伦理学解读立场再审视

Exploration and Questioning:Rethinking the Interpretation Position of Descartes'Virtue Ethics

近年来,随着美德伦理学的“复兴”,英语学界有学者提出应该以美德伦理学的视角解读笛卡尔的道德理论,其中以加拿大学者丽萨·沙皮洛(Lisa Shapiro)、巴西学者马塞洛·德·阿劳约(Marcelo de Araujo)为代表,他们认为笛卡尔的德性学说是古典美德伦理学的延续,相比于现代伦理学的视角,更应该以美德伦理的立场解读。然而,通过深入考察笛卡尔的德性理论,可以发现这一立场很难成立。首先,笛卡尔虽然规定了“德性是至善”,然而这一规定的内涵是空洞的,并未像其他目的论式的美德伦理学那样给出道德判断的标准。其次,他更为在先地规定了什么是道德正当,并以此为基础定义德性,而非美德伦理学那样通过先定义德性内涵进而规定行为的道德正当。因此,笛卡尔的道德理论并不符合美德伦理学的核心规定,不能用美德伦理学简单概括。

In recent years,with the“renaissance”of virtue ethics,some scholars of English-speaking academia have proposed that Descartes’theory of virtue should be interpreted from the perspective of virtue ethics,with Lisa Shapiro and Marcelo de Araujo as representatives.They believe that Descartes’theory of virtue is a continuation of classical virtue ethics,and compared to the perspective of modern ethics,it should be interpreted from the perspective of virtue ethics.However,through indepth examination of Descartes’theory of virtue,it can be found that this position is difficult to hold.Firstly,although Descartes stipulated that“virtue is the highest good”,the connotation of this provision is hollow and does not provide moral judgment standards like other teleological virtue ethics.Secondly,he established what is moral rightness and defined virtue based on it,rather than defining the moral rightness of behavior by defining the connotation of virtue in virtue ethics.Therefore,Descartes’theory of virtue does not conform to the core provisions of virtue ethics and cannot be simply summarized in virtue ethics.