死亡现象与先验自我——一项基于胡塞尔《C—手稿》和《极限问题》的考察

The Phenomena of Death and Transzendental I——An Examination based on Husserl’s C-manuscript and The Limits problem of Phenomenology

在2006年出版《C—手稿》和2014年出版的遗稿《极限问题》中胡塞尔试图通过对死亡现象的分析表明先验自我的不死性特征。这一观点引起不少学者的批评。泰德指出尽管胡塞尔在《C—手稿》中强调死亡与时间问题有关,但死亡作为一种中断是先验自我的彻底黑暗化,是“我不存在”的时间开始。哈特批评胡塞尔先验自我的不死性与无法被唤醒的死亡的“我”之间不相容。泰德和哈特对胡塞尔死亡现象学的批评具有一定的代表性。海涅娜则肯定胡塞尔的现象学方法为更深入地理解伊壁鸠鲁的死亡悖论提供了条件。基于海涅娜的探究以及相关文献,可以辨明的是,“先验自我的不死性”与具身性的先验自我的所谓“死亡”并不矛盾,泰德和哈特对胡塞尔的批评可以得到合理的反驳。

Husserl thematically explored the phenomenon of death in the publication of the C-manuscript in 2006 and the posthumous manuscript The Limits problem of Phenomenology in 2014.James argues that Husserl’s emphasis on death in the C-manuscript is related to the problem of time.But death does not tell us anything about time at all,because death is an interruption.Sara argues that Husserl’s phenomenological approach provides the conditions for a deeper understanding of Epictetus’s famous words and demonstrates the constructive role of death in the constitution of cultural objectivity and the cultural world.Hart understands Husserl’s concept of death as the ideal limit of sleep and consciousness deprivation.He argues,however,that there is a need for a theoretical reconciliation between the immortality of the transcendental I and the impossibility of awakening the“I”from death.This paper continues to deal with Husserl’s paradox of Epictetus’s death mentioned by Sara and the contradiction between“the immortality of transcendental I”and“the impossibility of awakening the I from death”.In this paper,it is argued that the above question can be answered reasonably by showing the non-contradiction between the“immortality of the transcendental I”and the“cancellation of the condition of the transcendental I’s participation in the intersubjective world through embodiment”.