摘要
在新近出版的《人工智能哲学十五讲》中,徐英瑾教授主张来自现象学的思想资源可以为当下的人工智能技术指明更好的研究方向。通过对书中两个具体论证的分析,本文指出徐教授的这一主张是缺乏根据的。通过与德雷福斯的人工智能哲学进行对比,本文试图指出,关于人工智能的有效哲学反思必须以对人工智能实践中涌现出的真正的哲学问题的洞见为基础。
In his new book Fifteen Lectures on the Philosophy of AI,Prof.Xu Yingjin argues that the current AI research may find a better direction by absorbing some insights from European phenomenology.Through a critical analysis of two main arguments in his book,I argue that Prof.Xu’s claim is unfounded.By comparing his work with that of Hubert Dreyfus,I further argue that an effective philosophical reflection on AI must be founded on the insight into the real philosophical problems inherent in the current AI practice.
作者
南星
Nan Xing(Department of Philosophy,Peking University,Beijing,100871)
出处
《哲学评论》
2022年第2期296-311,共16页
Wuda Philosophical Review
关键词
人工智能
现象学
徐英瑾
德雷福斯
Philosophy of AI
phenomenology
Xu Yingjin
Hubert Dreyfus