基建投资扩张与地方债务风险——基于专项债发行改革的准自然实验

The Expansion of Infrastructure Investment and Local Debt Risk——A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the Reform of Special Bond Issuance

以2014年地方政府债券自发自还试点政策作为准自然实验,基于2010-2018年30个省(区、市)面板数据,将基建投资、专项债发行与地方政府债务风险纳入同一分析框架,采用双重差分法研究了基础设施投资中专项债融资方式对地方政府债务风险的影响,结果显示:基建投资扩张是地方政府债务风险的主要来源,专项债发行能够显著抑制基建投资债务风险,尤其是在经济质量发展较弱和财政压力较大的地区,政策效果尤为明显。机制分析表明,专项债发行有效约束了地方基建投资扩张,纠正了官员晋升竞争动机,减轻了基建投资债务风险。对此,应当在对地方基础设施进行投融资时,坚持“效率原则”,提高基建债务资金的使用效率;地方债务整治要坚持“隐性债务显性化”,管控应以专项债方式进行基建投资;应不断创新地方官员考核制度。

Taking the pilot policy of spontaneous self-repayment of local government bonds in 2014 as a quasi-natural experiment,based on the 30 provinces(regions,cities)panel data from 2010 to 2018,this paper puts infrastructure investment,special bond issuance and local government debt risk into the same analytical framework,and studies the impact of infrastructure investment on local government debt risk through special bond financing by using double difference method.It is found that the expansion of infrastructure investment is the main source of local government debt risk,and the issuance of special bonds can significantly curb the debt risk of infrastructure investment,especially in areas with weak economic quality development and great financial pressure the policy effect is particularly obvious.The mechanism analysis shows that the issuance of special bonds effectively restricts the expansion of local infrastructure investment and corrects the competitive motivation of officialspromotion,and reduce the debt risk of infrastructure investment.In this regard,when investing on financing local infrastructure,we should uphold the“efficiency principle”to improve the efficiency of the use of capital construction debt funds;Local debt rectification should adhere to the“explicit implicit debt”and control infrastructure investment in the form of special debt;We should constantly innovate the assessment system for local officials.