摘要
根据通常的定义,超义务行为是具备道德价值但同时是非义务性的行为。超义务概念面临两个困难:(1)“价值溢出难题”:超出义务的价值是什么?(2)“道德榜样难题”:为什么高尚者往往认为他们的超义务之举是义务性的?文章旨在回应这两个挑战,从而阐明超义务的可能性。针对价值溢出难题,作者在理清义务、理由、价值等概念的基础上指出,超义务之举溢出于义务的价值源于主体品性的价值。针对道德榜样难题,作者首先区分了道德形而上学和道德决策两个评价维度;进而论证,主体可以合理地(道德决策维度)把非义务性的行为(道德形而上学维度)视作义务。
Supererogatory actions are typically defined as valuable but non-obligatory actions.The concept of supererogation is faced with two difficulties:"the value overflow problem"and"the moral exemplar problem".While the value overflow problem concerns how a supererogatory action might possess extra value besides the value of fulflling moral obligations,the moral exemplar problem concerns how noble agents might be justified in believing that the supererogatory actions are obligatory.In response to the value overflow problem,by clarifying many conceptual confusions,the author proposes that the bearers of the additional values of supererogatory actions are the virtues of the agents.In dealing with the moral exemplar problem,by distinguishing two dimensions of evaluation,moral metaphysics and moral decision-making,the author aims to argue that an agent might be justified,as far as moral decisionmaking is concerned,in believing that their supererogatory actions,metaphysically speaking,are obligatory.
出处
《世界哲学》
北大核心
2023年第5期120-129,F0003,共11页
World Philosophy