消费者信息投入对供应链广告与定价策略的影响

Influence of consumer information investment on supply chain advertising and pricing strategies

通过建立博弈模型,研究了4种不同成本分担模式下供应商和零售商的均衡策略和均衡收益,分析了消费者信息投入对各均衡结果的影响,并对比了4种情形下的均衡策略和均衡收益,讨论了不同成本分担模式对供应商和零售商的影响.结果发现,消费者信息投入的有效性取决于广告和产品价格对市场需求的相对影响.当广告对市场需求的影响小于价格带来的影响时,消费者信息投入会导致供应商和零售商收益降低.当制造商和零售商共同承担消费者信息投入时,制造商会通过提高批发价格将消费者信息投入成本转移给零售商.相较于非合作广告,当制造商和零售商进行广告合作时,2个企业都会提高定价;考虑消费者信息投入时,供应商更倾向于进行广告合作,而零售商则偏好非合作广告.

A game theory model is established to explore equilibrium strategies and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer and to analyze the influence of consumer information investment on these equilibrium results.Equilibrium strategies and profits of different cost-sharing modes are compared to study the effect of different modes on the manufacturer and the retailer.The results show that the effectiveness of consumer information investment depends on the relative impact of advertising and retail price on market demand.Investing in consumer information will reduce profits of the manufacturer and retailer if the impact of advertising is much smaller than that of price.Furthermore,the manufacturer will transfer the information expense to the retailer by increasing the wholesale price even if it commits to sharing the consumer information investment.In addition,the manufacturer chooses a higher wholesale price,and the retailer sets a higher price when the two companies cooperate in advertising than when they do not.Meanwhile,the retailer prefers non-cooperative advertising to cooperative advertising,while the manufacturer prefers cooperative advertising when considering consumer information investment.